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Glossary of Terms
Accumulation: In DC this refers to the period of pension contributions and 
investment, after which the fund is used to provide the lifetime income in 
retirement (known as decumulation).
Active investment: The selection of investments by the manager who aims to 
outperform an investment benchmark. See passive investment and smart beta.
Active member: A member of a DC scheme who is working for the sponsoring 
employer. See also deferred member.
Active member discount (AMD): A lower annual management charge that 
applies to active members of a scheme, which is increased when they leave 
employment. See deferred member penalty.
Alternative asset class: A collective term used to describe asset classes that 
generally are illiquid, such as commodities, hedge funds, infrastructure, private 
equity, and real estate, among others. 
Annual management charge (AMC): The annual management charge, 
deducted from member funds, covers disclosed investment costs and 
administration, among other items. The AMC is regarded as an incomplete 
disclosure measure. The total expense ratio is more comprehensive, but is 
still not complete, nor is ongoing charges. There is growing pressure for asset 
managers to disclose all fund costs such as transaction costs and the costs of 
sub-funds. 
Annuity: A lifetime annuity is an insurance policy that guarantees an income for 
life in return for the DC pension fund (the insurance premium). The purchaser is 
described as an annuitant. There are also fixed-term annuities.
Annuity rate: The income the insurance company guarantees to pay per 
month or per annum in return for the lump sum. It can also be expressed as a 
percentage yield. 
Auto-enrolment: The new system of pension scheme provision for all employers, 
which mainly affects the private sector and which is being phased in between 
October 2012 and 2018. Employers and qualifying workers (those aged 
between 22 and the state pension age, earning at least £9,440 in 2013-2014) 
must make minimum contributions based on band earnings, but the latter 
have the right to opt out. Qualifying auto-enrolment schemes do not have to be 
DC but, in practice, the majority will be so. They must offer a default fund for 
members who do not wish to make their own investment decisions.
Band earnings:  Under auto-enrolment, for qualifying workers the minimum 
contribution is 8% (comprising 4% from the employee, 3% from the employer, 
and 1% in tax relief), based on ‘band earnings’ of £5,668-41,450 in 2013-14. 
The contribution requirements are being phased in, starting with a minimum of 
2% of qualifying earnings, of which the employer must pay a minimum of 1%.
Blended fund: The term used to describe a multi-asset default fund. Most 
commonly, it is used to denote a fund designed by an employee benefits 
consultant for a large employer’s single trust-based scheme.
Bundled scheme: A DC scheme where the provider is responsible for both the 
asset management and administration functions. An alternative description, used 
by the OFT, is vertical integration.
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Commission: Until January 2013, many corporate advisers that sold pension 
schemes to employers were remunerated by the provider in the form of sales 
commission, the cost of which was incorporated into the member’s annual 
management charge. They must now charge the employer a fee. See RDR. 
Contract-based DC:  DC schemes can be established under contract or trust 
law. In a contract-based scheme, the contract is between the member and 
the provider, for example a life office. Contract-based DC is regulated by the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). See also trust-based DC.
Consultancy charge: Initially this replaced sales commission following the 
RDR, but the government banned the charge shortly after it was introduced, as 
it was concerned that the deduction of the charge from member contributions 
would undermine auto-enrolment, especially for lower earners and frequent job 
changers.
Core asset class: A ‘core’ asset in a default fund denotes an asset class that 
represents a single and significant component of the fund.  See also alternative 
asset class.
Corporate adviser: The distinction between employee benefits consultants and 
corporate advisers is blurred. Historically it denoted the remuneration basis (fees 
or commission respectively), but it also denotes the target market, which, for 
corporate advisers, tends to be the SME.
Decumulation: The process whereby the DC fund built up during the 
accumulation stage is converted into a lifetime income in retirement. Typically 
this involves the purchase of a lifetime annuity, but the member might also draw 
directly from the fund (income drawdown).
Default fund: In a DC scheme this is the multi-asset fund designated to receive 
the contributions of members who do not make an investment choice. Under 
auto-enrolment, an estimated 90-97% of members will rely on this fund. 
Deferred member: The description applied to members of DC schemes 
who leave the sponsoring employer’s company. In a trust-based scheme, 
membership continues and so former employees continue to be the responsibility 
of the scheme trustees. In a contract-based scheme, the contract would usually 
be reclassified as an individual personal pension, so the individual is no longer a 
member of the previous employer’s scheme. 
Deferred member penalty (DMP): An increased annual management charge 
applied when a member leaves a scheme where an active member discount is 
used.
Defined ambition (DA): A DWP initiative that aims to encourage employers to 
provide DC schemes that offer more predictable outcomes, for example via some 
form of return guarantee or risk-sharing mechanism between different cohorts of 
members.
Defined benefit (DB): Members’ pensions are linked to salary (e.g., final salary 
or now more commonly earnings averaged over the period of membership). 
The sponsoring employer is ultimately responsible for meeting the liability if the 
scheme is underfunded. See defined contribution. 
Defined contribution (DC): In DC, the member’s pension is based mainly on the 
level of contributions invested, the charges deducted, and investment returns. The 
fund is used at retirement to generate a lifetime income, usually in the form of an 
annuity. Therefore the investment and longevity risks, among others, fall solely 
on the individual members.
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Diversified beta: see smart beta.
Diversified growth fund (DGF): A fund that aims to increase the return and/or 
reduce risk through investing in a wide range of asset classes, usually including 
alternative asset classes.
Employee benefit consultant (EBC): The distinction between EBCs and 
corporate advisers is historic and generally denoted the remuneration basis. 
EBCs generally target the larger employers (DB and DC) and trustees. They might 
also act as a fiduciary manager if they have launched their own DC scheme. 
Fiduciary manager: With reference to DC schemes, this is where an asset 
manager or EBC offers a full asset management service for the default fund, 
drawing on third-party asset manager funds (and sometimes their own funds) 
for each asset class.  The role is broadly equivalent to that of a chief investment 
officer. Where an EBC offers its own scheme, it would manage the administration 
(in-house or, more likely, via third-party arrangements, including life office 
platforms).
Glide path: In a default fund, members’ funds are transitioned over a period of 
years before retirement (e.g. 10-15) from risky assets into bonds and cash, for 
example, in order to protect them from market shocks before decumulation and 
the purchase of an annuity. 
Group personal pension scheme (GPPS): A contract-based workplace pension 
scheme. In effect a grouping of individual personal pension plans but with 
pricing to reflect the group nature of the arrangement.
Income drawdown: At retirement, instead of purchasing an annuity, the 
member draws a regular income directly from the fund. The maximum amount 
that can be drawn is linked to the prevailing annuity rate.
Index tracking: See passive management.
Investible frontier: The practical risk-return tradeoff frontier for investors. It is not 
strictly the same as the efficient frontier. Along the efficient frontier, investors can 
only increase their expected return by assuming more investment risk and vice 
versa. The true efficient frontier is likely to be further out in risk-return space than 
the investible frontier. Nevertheless, for all practical purposes we can think of the 
investible frontier as being approximately the same as the efficient frontier.
Life fund: The generic term to describe collective or pooled funds sold by the life 
office and asset management arms of insurance companies.
Lifestyle/lifecycle: Another term to describe the glide path of a default fund. 
Here the strategic decisions are made by the scheme fiduciaries and their 
advisers. Although it appears to be a single fund, the glide path usually uses 
different risk-graded funds for the main growth phase and the de-risking phase. 
See target date fund.
Long-only strategies: Investment strategies that only involve the purchase of 
securities (i.e., no short selling)
Long-short strategies: Investment strategies that involve the purchase of some 
securities (those that are believed to be under-priced) and the short selling of 
other securities (those that are believed to be overpriced) 
Master trust: A trust-based DC workplace pension scheme that can 
accommodate multiple non-related employers. The trustee board might 
be wholly independent of the scheme provider or might include provider 
representation.  
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Micro employer: In the context of auto-enrolment, an employer with fewer than 
50 employees. See SME.
Middleware: One of the terms used to describe IT systems that integrate the 
employers’ payroll system with the auto-enrolment duties to enrol employees and 
to pay the correct level of contributions.
Ongoing charges: A disclosure method for fund costs and charges 
recommended by the IMA for UK authorised funds.
Passive investment: Also known as index-tracking, here the manager purchases 
all the stocks or a representative selection of stocks in the relevant index 
according to standard market capitalisation weightings. See active investment 
and smart beta.
Personal pension plan (PPP): An individual (retail) DC pension plan, introduced 
in 1988.
Platform: With reference to DC schemes, this is the life office IT ‘engine’, 
which manages the day-to-day running of a range of functions including asset 
management, administration (e.g., of contributions), and compliance. It might 
also include member communication and documentation, or this might be part 
of the middleware. 
Replacement ratio (RR): The member’s income replacement ratio (RR) is the ratio 
of the pension in the first year of retirement to the final salary before retirement
Retail Distribution Review (RDR): The RDR came into effect on 1 January 2013. 
It banned adviser commission for new sales of investment products, including 
pension schemes and plans. From this date onwards, all advice relating to the 
sale of new investment products must be fee-based.
Self-select funds: The term used to describe the range of funds in which 
members of a DC scheme can invest if they want to make their own decisions, as 
opposed to using the default fund. Not all schemes offer self-select funds.
Sharpe ratio: This measures risk-adjusted performance. The ratio is calculated 
by subtracting the risk-free rate (e.g. Treasury bill rate), from the rate of return for 
a portfolio and then dividing the result by the standard deviation of the portfolio 
returns.
Smart beta: A form of enhanced passive investment where the asset manager 
deviates from the standard market capitalisation weightings in the relevant index. 
Typically this involves reducing the weighting in what are considered overvalued 
stocks and increasing the weighting in undervalued stocks, where the valuation 
of stocks is typically based on ‘fundamental’ factors, such as P/E ratios and 
dividend yields. A variation is diversified beta which looks for the fundamental 
drivers of returns across a wider range of asset classes than just stocks.
SME: Small and medium-sized enterprise. For auto-enrolment purposes, the 
term can be used to describe employers with 50-250 employees, but in more 
general use it can mean anything up to 500 employees. See micro employer. 
It is relevant that of the 1.3m employers required to implement auto-enrolment, 
almost 1m have fewer than 10 employees.
Staging date: This is the date at which employers’ new duties under auto-
enrolment become obligatory. The date depends on the size of the employer’s 
pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) scheme. It began with the largest employers in October 
2012 (120,000+ employees in the PAYE scheme) and concludes in 2017-18 
with the smallest.
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Stakeholder pension scheme: Introduced in 2001, stakeholder schemes are 
like group personal pension schemes, but must meet certain requirements in 
relation to accessibility and fair terms and conditions.
Target date fund (TDF): An investment strategy designed for DC default funds, 
whereby the scheme establishes a range of TDFs, each with its own glide path. 
This might involve a TDF for each possible retirement date, or there might be a 
single TDF for members who plan (or are expected) to retire within a given five-
year window, for example. So, a 40-year-old joining in 2013 might be put into 
the 2038 TDF if he or she is expected to retire at age 65. See lifestyle.
Total expense ratio (TER): The TER is a more comprehensive measure of the 
member’s total annual cost than the annual management charge (AMC), but is 
still not complete. It includes the AMC and fees for a range of services including 
legal, administration, audit, marketing, directors, and regulatory costs. There is 
growing pressure on schemes to reveal all fund costs, including transaction costs 
and the cost of sub-funds.
Transaction costs: Costs that are incurred as a consequence of dealing in assets. 
These include bid-offer spreads, transaction costs of underlying (sub) funds, 
profits from stock lending retained by fund managers, interest on cash balances 
retained by fund managers, and FX spreads on currency hedging, among others. 
Trust-based DC: Schemes set up under trust law where the trustees are the legal 
owners of the assets on behalf of members and have a fiduciary duty to act in 
members’ best interests. These schemes are regulated by The Pensions Regulator 
(TPR).
Value-at-Risk (VaR): A downside measure of the level of financial risk within a 
fund over a specific time frame. The risk manager aims to ensure that risks are 
not taken beyond the level at which the firm can absorb losses equal to the VaR. 
Vertical integration: Also known as bundled, this term describes schemes where 
the provider runs the asset management and administration.   
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Foreword 
Auto-enrolment is the new workplace system for pension scheme provision for all 
employers, although its main impact will be felt in the private sector. It is being 
phased in by employers between October 2012 and 2018. The most important 
feature of auto-enrolment schemes is the default fund, which is the multi-asset 
investment strategy designed for the majority of members who do not wish to 
make investment decisions. Total contributions, member charges, together with 
the fund’s full costs, the asset allocation, and the glide path (the changing asset 
allocation over the period of membership) are key determinants of the level of 
the pension income in retirement that is secured by the fund at the decumulation 
stage, which, at present, usually involves the purchase of a lifetime annuity.
In October 2012, the Pensions Institute published Caveat Venditor: The brave new 
world of auto-enrolment should be governed by the principle of seller not buyer 
beware.1 The report analysed the DC default funds used for auto-enrolment from 
two main perspectives. The first was qualitative: the impact on member outcomes 
of the behaviour of buyers (employers and trustees on behalf of members) and 
sellers (the providers and advisers). The second was quantitative: the application 
of stochastic simulation methods to identify the likely range of possible member 
outcomes based on an appropriately calibrated pension simulation model. 
In this new report we ask whether the cost of membership (we use the total 
expense ratio or TER) offers value for money to the ‘average’ member, by which 
we mean the 90-97% of employees who will be automatically enrolled into the 
default fund. To answer this question, we build on the preliminary quantitative and 
qualitative findings of Caveat Venditor, which are summarised in Appendix 1, and 
provide fresh analysis of the rapidly-evolving supply chain, which determines the 
employer’s choice of auto-enrolment scheme and the TER.  Conventional wisdom 
in the DC market suggests that you get what you pay for: that higher charges 
are rewarded in the form of a better member outcome. In the context of auto-
enrolment, the research finds that this is not the case.2
The new quantitative work presents in full the results of a unique modelling 
exercise that investigated the after-charge investment performance of a 
representative sample of contract- and trust-based default funds sold between 
1990 and 2013.3 We express performance outcomes in terms of the income 
replacement ratio (RR), by which we mean the ratio of the pension in the first 
year of retirement to the final salary before retirement that could be achieved by 
participating in each fund over different investment horizons. 
 ‘Value for money’ (VfM) does not necessarily mean ‘cheapest’, as the National 
Audit Office (NAO) explains in the quotation on the front cover of this report.4 
1  www.pensions-institute.org/reports/caveatvenditor.pdf 
2 For evidence of this in the context of UK pension fund investment, see, e.g., Blake, D, Lehmann, B, 
and Timmermann, A. (1999) ‘Asset Allocation Dynamics and Pension Fund Performance’, Journal of 
Business, 72, 429-61.
3 We have not modelled ethical and Sharia default funds, but suggest if membership levels prove 
to be significant, this would be a valuable exercise, given the significant asset allocation restrictions 
Sharia funds in particular face.
4 See http://www.nao.org.uk/intelligent-monitoring/intelligent-monitoring/about-monitoring/why-
monitor/ 
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Therefore our qualitative analysis examines VfM in relation to the objectives of 
the component parts of the supply chain and asks how well scheme providers’ 
business models are aligned with the requirements of the buyers of the schemes 
(the employers), the sellers of schemes (the advisers) and the real customer – the 
scheme members who have no say in the employer’s choice of scheme or its 
cost. The key features of a scheme’s VfM are the design and cost of the default 
asset allocation strategy, plus scheme costs, such as administration, marketing 
and communication. In most cases, the stated cost of asset management is not 
the biggest component of the total expense ratio (TER). However, it is not always 
clear what other component costs cover and whether these should be paid for 
by the member. In some cases, the member charge increases when a member 
leaves the scheme or transfers their pot to another scheme. Good governance 
requires VfM to be maximised, while recognising that ‘cheapest’ does not 
always mean ‘best’ and that the quality of services such as administration is as 
important as their cost. Good governance also requires the regular assessment 
of how the scheme is delivering VfM.
We believe that the present report, through its integrated qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of the supply chain, the cost of membership (TER), the 
investment strategy, and scheme governance will inform the debate about what 
constitutes a ‘good’ DC scheme. While we agree that the level of contribution is 
a key determinant of the member outcomes, and that the 8% of band earnings 
being phased in is not sufficient, we argue that the minimum contribution level 
should not be increased above that level until the government is confident that 
qualifying schemes represent good value for money for members.  
Our research began in November 2012, immediately after the publication of 
Caveat Venditor, and concluded in December 2013. We would like to thank 
the many organisations that helped with this research.  Those that were happy 
to be named are listed in the acknowledgements. Where we quote from a 
published report, the source is cited. Where we quote from interviews, the 
comments are anonymised. This technique, pioneered by the Pensions Institute 
for its practitioner reports, enables us to express the views of stakeholders more 
candidly than might otherwise be the case.
We would particularly like to thank the four sponsors of the research: B&CE’s 
The People’s Pension, Hymans Robertson, NEST, and NOW: Pensions. The views 
expressed in this report are those of the authors, not necessarily those of the 
sponsors, which did not seek to influence the research, or the Pensions Institute, 
which takes no policy positions. It is important to note that the individual schemes 
cannot be identified in the quantitative modelling results due to a randomisation 
of the scheme labels, and that in the interests of scientific integrity, even the 
sponsors were given no information that would enable them to identify the 
performance of their own schemes.
Debbie Harrison, David Blake and Kevin Dowd  
The Pensions Institute, Cass Business School, City University London
January 2014
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Findings 
1.  We predict that the DC workplace scheme market will increase more than 
six-fold by 2030, from £276bn assets under management (AUM) pre-auto-
enrolment (2012) to about £1.7trn. 
2.  We expect five or six trust-based multi-employer schemes to dominate the 
market by 2020. The associated rapid consolidation among providers could 
lead to market instability. There is already evidence of providers withdrawing 
from sections of the market they originally planned to serve.
3.  Single employer schemes are likely to transfer to multi-employer 
arrangements once employers have removed their defined benefit liabilities 
from the balance sheet, at which point they will be able to dismantle their DB 
trustee infrastructure.
4.  The practice of ‘cherry-picking’, whereby providers take on only the 
profitable section of a workforce, is undermining employers’ trust in 
providers. It can force SMEs that have an existing provider either to run two 
schemes or to switch to a new provider just before their staging date.  
5.  A re-evaluation of contract law is urgently required to facilitate the mass 
migration of member assets from old to new schemes to ensure value for 
money for the full accumulation period.
6.  Former commission-based corporate advisers face an uncertain future. From 
mid-2014, ‘disintermediation’ will be the hallmark of scheme distribution, 
with employers increasingly seeking solutions from the major master trusts. 
SMEs with no pre-existing scheme are likely to tackle compliance mainly 
through payroll (rather than pension) solutions. 
The withdrawal of formerly-commission-based advisers that cannot operate 
profitably on a fee basis puts multi-employer schemes under increased 
pressure to provide employers with compliance software to meet auto-
enrolment duties.  However, payroll software providers are also offering 
partial or full auto-enrolment compliance solutions. 
7.  The meaning of member value for money (VfM) is distorted by supply-side 
imperatives that are poorly-aligned with members’ interests. From 2014, 
many providers will prioritise their services:
•	 First, to the corporate adviser (formerly commission-based, now fee-
based), which sells schemes to employers and whose advice in this market 
is unregulated
•	Second, to the employer, which acts as the provider’s unregulated agent  
•	 Third, to the member, who pays for the scheme, but has no choice in the 
design or charges 
Our research found cases where providers provided services both to 
advisers who helped bring in business and to employers free of charge, but 
then covered the cost of those services via the member charge, raising the 
question whether this was fair to members.  
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8.  The total expense ratio (TER) is a key determinant of the default fund’s 
outcome, which we express as an income replacement ratio (RR) in 
retirement. Of the funds modelled, the default fund with highest mean 
RR (23.8%) was 55% higher than that with the lowest mean RR (15.3%). 
This was largely due to charge differences. As a rough rule of thumb, 
each percentage point increase in the TER leads to a fall in the expected 
replacement ratio at retirement of about 20%, and to a somewhat smaller 
fall in the lower bound of the projected retirement replacement ratio.
9.  While the investment strategy has an important impact on member 
outcomes, it is much less important than the impact of charges. 
10.  There is a notable trade-off between risk and return, but it is only the low- 
charge schemes that lie along the investible frontier. In other words, while 
‘cheapest’ is not synonymous with ‘best’, there is no evidence that higher 
charges can ‘buy’ more sophisticated investment strategies that deliver 
superior performance. 
11.  Two types of fund tend to deliver above-average outcomes relative to 
contributions paid: single trust-based schemes, designed by fee-based 
consultants for large employers; and modern trust-based multi-employer 
schemes. 
12.  Individuals in high charging schemes could benefit considerably from 
switching to low charging schemes, unless ‘exit penalties’ are prohibitive. 
13.  Longer investment horizons generally deliver better average outcomes with 
lower risk. Roughly speaking, doubling the length of the investment period 
(e.g., from 5 to 10, then from 10 to 20 years, etc.) approximately doubles 
the mean replacement ratio. The lower bound grows at only the square root 
of the length of the investment period, approximately. In other words, VfM 
increases the longer the member remains invested (so long as charges are 
competitive).
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Recommendations 
1. A clear definition of member VfM
Value for money (VfM) for members means the optimal combination of scheme 
cost and design, sustainable over the accumulation and decumulation periods. 
This includes:
•	  A TER in the region of 0.5% a year for the accumulation period (at current 
levels of scale)
•	  A well-designed multi-asset default fund with a glide path that is subject to 
regular modelling scrutiny in relation to the member income replacement 
ratio (RR) and the downside risks.
•	  Expert independent governance fully aligned with all members’ interests, 
including both active and deferred, through accumulation into decumulation. 
Governance requires the expertise to assess VfM in relation to design and 
charges and should have demonstrable power to manage all conflicts in the 
members’ best interests. 
•	  Effective member communications that focus on improving the outcome, e.g., 
paying higher contributions, working longer, and/or delaying the annuity 
purchase date.
•	  An efficient consolidation system that helps members to transfer older DC 
pots to the new scheme, where these are held in poorly diversified funds with 
higher charges. 
•	  A decumulation service that is part of the scheme and provided by a specialist 
retirement-income adviser that adheres to robust service standards.
2. A clear definition of the member’s target outcome in terms of an income 
replacement ratio
The only meaningful expression of the member outcome is the income 
replacement ratio (RR). It is currently common to express member outcome in 
terms of fund size; but, fund size is a poor measure of member outcome, since it 
does not take account of the annuity-conversion risks, which include interest rate 
volatility and longevity risk.
However, it does not necessarily make sense to target RR or fund size as part of 
the default fund’s investment strategy. It is important to avoid over-engineering 
the default fund’s investment strategy which should have a straightforward target, 
such as CPI (consumer price index) + X%. Any targeting of outcomes (ideally in 
terms of RR) needs to be conducted through the scheme’s funding strategy. This 
might require additional employer and/or employee contributions if there is a 
shortfall in the target.
3. A clear definition of costs and charges, reported in full 
All costs extracted by the default fund and the scheme should be reported in 
full to governance boards and to regulators, so that component parts of the 
member charge, as well as the total, can be evaluated in relation to member 
VfM. Full disclosure data should also be made available on a central website for 
independent public scrutiny.
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4. Assets in older sub-standard schemes to migrate to new schemes
A thorough review of, and a revision to contract law in relation to DC pensions 
should enable the government and regulators to prompt an evaluation and  
mass migration of assets from older schemes (pre-2013) – many of which are 
characterised by sub-optimal asset management, as well as higher charges, 
including adviser commission – to modern schemes or to one or more modern 
aggregators (to be designated). This process should include all personal pension 
plans created when members of contract-based schemes leave employment. 
The OFT-instigated audit of charges in pre-2001 contract-based schemes should 
apply to all schemes sold before January 2013 and should be undertaken by 
the regulators, not by a ‘committee’ dominated by the providers that sold the 
schemes in the first place.
5. The need for regulatory reform
The current dual system of regulation whereby The Pensions Regulator regulates 
trust-based schemes and the Financial Conduct Authority regulates contract-
based schemes should be reformed.
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Section 1: Value for money and the supply chain 
In this section, we examine the meaning of value for money (VfM) and consider 
the implications of supply-side imperatives for members, who are at the end 
of the supply chain. In the following section, we examine two key quantifiable 
components of value for money in a representative range of default funds 
currently available in the UK – namely, charges and investment strategy – and 
model their impact on potential pension outcomes for scheme members who rely 
on the default fund.
1.1 Auto-enrolment: a game changer for providers and advisers
The Pensions Acts of 2007 and 2008 imposed new legal duties on all employers, 
the main burden of which will fall on private sector employers.5 Starting with the 
largest employers in October 2012, and ending with the smallest in 2018, the 
auto-enrolment legislation requires employers to enrol qualifying workers (those 
earning at least £9,440 in 2013-2014) between age 22 and the state pension 
age into a ‘designated’ pension scheme, which must include a default fund for 
members who do not wish to make investment decisions.  The policy objective 
of auto-enrolment is to ensure employees build up adequate private pensions, 
which will reduce the financial burden of the retired population on the state and, 
therefore, on the tax-payer.
The date at which the new duties take effect (the ‘staging date’) depends on the 
size of the employer’s pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) scheme.6 The first staging date 
in October 2012 applied to employers with 120,000+ employees in the PAYE 
scheme; the final staging dates in 2017 and 2018 apply to employers with fewer 
than 30 employees.7 More than 30,000 employers with workforces of 50–250+ 
will have received notice of their staging date by April 2014. We define this 
category as small and medium enterprises (SMEs) for the purpose of this report. 
Micro employers (defined in this report as those with fewer than 50 employees) 
will start to receive their staging date notification later in the year. Numerically, 
SMEs and micro employers account for the vast majority of employers.
There was a consensus among all interviewees for this research that compliance 
with initial auto-enrolment will be a burden for SMEs and micro employers. 
In most cases, they will need help in assessing employees in relation to their 
contract of employment and to earnings, which might fluctuate month-by-month. 
However, there was considerable disagreement as to whether the best source of 
employer support should be the scheme provider, the payroll software provider, 
an off-the-shelf pension/payroll software provider, or an adviser. The choice is 
made more complicated by the fact that the smaller employers are least likely 
to be prepared to pay for advice, particularly if they have no existing pension 
provision on which to build.
For qualifying workers, the minimum contribution rate is 8% (comprising 4% 
from the employee, 3% from the employer, and 1% in tax relief), based on ‘band 
5 Most, but not all public sector schemes already use auto-enrolment.
6  www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/employers/staging-date-timeline.aspx 
7 The confirmed schedule applies to employers who will reach their staging date by 2015, when the 
General Election will be held. However, there is a provisional schedule for post-election employers. 
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earnings’ of £5,668-£41,450 in 2013-14. Employer and employee contribution 
rates are being phased in, which means that the full 8% will not be compulsory 
until 2017-18. Employers can choose to set higher minimum contribution rates, 
but while this practice is common among some of the larger employers, many 
SMEs and micro employers are expected to meet the minimum requirement 
only. It is widely recognised – and acknowledged by the government – that 8% 
of band earnings will not deliver adequate pensions, even when combined 
with the simplified state pension set above the level of means tested benefits 
being introduced in April 2016.8 Many of the people we interviewed expect the 
government to increase the minimum contribution rate requirement shortly after 
auto-enrolment is fully implemented. 
Under auto-enrolment, employees have the right to opt out, but, if they do 
so, employers must re-enrol them every three years. This is the feature that 
distinguishes auto-enrolment from full compulsion – where opt-outs are not 
permitted – which is the system used in Australia9, the Asia-Pacific region, Eastern 
and Central Europe, and in Central and South American countries.
The success of auto-enrolment, therefore, is predicated on the behavioural trait 
of inertia, namely, that once in, members will stay put.10  This is the first game 
changer – it is no longer necessary to ‘sell’ the benefits of scheme membership 
to employees.11 The second game changer is equally significant. It is no longer 
necessary to sell the benefits of pension schemes to employers, because they must 
have a designated scheme in order to fulfil their legal duties. Accordingly, this is 
a compulsory purchase on the part of employers. In most cases, they can choose 
the provider, but providers have the right to turn them down; the exception being 
NEST, which has a public service obligation to accept any employer and a number 
of providers have now entered the market and are providing pensions to all 
employers (e.g., B&CE’s The People’s Pension).
These game changers affect the supply chain in ways that are already evident 
and in ways which have yet to be fully understood. In particular, auto-enrolment 
disrupts the traditional role of providers and advisers as ‘manufacturers’ and 
‘sellers’ of schemes respectively. The market will experience considerable 
upheaval between now and 2020, a period we predict will be characterised by 
rapid consolidation, with the number of large-scale multi-employer schemes 
reducing to five or six. Consolidation among providers will take the form of 
mergers and acquisitions and also sales of DC pension scheme books, which 
might go to consolidators that are uncompetitive because they do not sell 
new schemes. We also expect the adviser market to contract, both at EBC and 
corporate adviser level.
Providers and advisers are well aware that auto-enrolment is a one-off opportunity 
to win sufficient market share to survive in their current form. The stakes are high. 
8 See, for example, Pensions Policy Institute, ‘What Level of Pension Contribution is Needed to Obtain
an Adequate Retirement Income?’, October 2013, https://www.pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk/
uploadeddocuments/20131022_AE_Adequacy_FINAL_REPORT.pdf
9 In Australia, where full compulsion was introduced in the early 1990s, the modern ‘Super’ 
scheme is a trust-based, not-for-profit multi-employer arrangement that appears to have very strong 
governance.
10 Opt-out rates for the largest employers – the first to implement auto-enrolment – are in the region 
of 8-15%.
11 In a voluntary market, most pensions are sold not bought.
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We predict the DC workplace scheme market will increase more than six-fold 
by 2030, from £276bn AUM pre-auto-enrolment (2012) to about £1.7trn.12 
Competition is fierce, with concerns already emerging about predatory pricing, 
‘vertical integration’ (where providers also act as in-house asset managers), the 
increasing number of tied arrangements between providers and ‘independent’ 
advisers, and the entrance of EBCs as scheme providers in their own right. 
1.2 2013: A year of consultation on competition and VfM
Following the publication of Caveat Venditor in October 2012, which drew 
attention to the pernicious impact of high charges on member outcomes, 
in January 2013, the OFT began its investigation into competition in the 
DC scheme market. Its report, published in September 2013, described a 
market where the buy side was characterised by a low level of knowledge and 
understanding (the main drivers for competition) and a high level of complacency 
on the supply side.13 Among other findings, the OFT identified £40bn of assets 
in high-charging pre-2001 schemes representing 1.4m members, which the 
industry has agreed to investigate. It also found that active member discounts 
(AMDs), which confer lower charges on active members, but higher charges 
on leavers (via deferred member penalties or DMPs), were evident in 10,000 
schemes, representing £13.4bn AUM. 
The OFT concluded that ‘competition cannot be relied upon to ensure value for 
money for savers in the DC workplace pensions market’. The blame in part, it 
said, lay in poor governance, particularly in contract-based schemes, where the 
interests of decision-makers are not well-aligned with the interests of members, 
and where the absence of a single decision-maker with ultimate responsibility for 
member outcomes ‘creates scope for misaligned incentives’.14 In response to the 
OFT report, in October 2013, the DWP published its long-awaited consultation 
on a member charge cap, while throughout that year the DWP was consulting on 
the ways in which quality can be demonstrated by DC schemes.15  
A very timely new entrant to the debate was the Law Commission, which 
published a consultation paper in October 2013 that examined the ways in 
which fiduciary duties apply to investment intermediaries, including investment 
consultants, asset managers and custodians.16 One of the Commission’s 
12 Source: The Pensions Institute. The main assumptions underlying this projection are auto-enrolment 
minimum contribution rates of 8% of salary p.a., salary growth of 5% p.a., nominal investment returns 
of 6% p.a., and CPI inflation of 3% p.a. Personal pensions are excluded from this estimate.
13 http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/market-studies/oft1505 
14 The OFT found similar knowledge gaps in the trustee boards of small trust-based schemes. However, 
here at least there is a governance framework that can be improved in terms of skills and knowledge, 
because under law and regulation trustees’ interests should be wholly aligned with the members’.
15  Quality Standards in Workplace Defined Contribution Schemes, https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/210700/quality-standards-workplace-defined-
contribution-pension-schemes.pdf; Better Workplace Pensions: A Consultation on Charges, https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/254332/cm8737-pension-
charges.pdf 
16 Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries, October 2013, http://lawcommission.justice.gov.
uk/areas/fiduciary_duties.htm. The project follows from the Kay Review on UK Equity Markets and 
Long Term Decision Making, July 2012, http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/areas/fiduciary_duties.
htm. The report revealed a complicated supply chain with a reported 13 levels of intermediation.
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proposals is to regulate advice to employers – a recommendation we made 
in Caveat Venditor. The reason for the present anomaly is that the FCA (and 
previously the FSA) appears to regard all employers, irrespective of size, as 
institutional purchasers. Yet, as earlier reports from the DWP17 and the September 
2013 OFT report make very clear, many SMEs and micro employers know as 
much about pension schemes as the average employee, i.e., little or nothing.18 
The Law Commission’s consultation raised concerns about the potential conflicts 
of interests in master trusts where the provider is the asset manager and is able 
to influence the trustee board directly or indirectly. This point was also stressed by 
the OFT and is high on the agenda for TPR analysis. The Law Commission said:
Some master trusts schemes may suffer from conflicts of interest. Trustees who 
are appointed and paid by the pension provider may not be able to challenge the 
provider’s actions. In particular, trustees may not be able to change investment 
managers when in-house funds are under-performing.
The Law Commission pointed to the dual regulatory structure as problematic, 
since it allows for ‘regulator shopping’ or what is more commonly known as 
regulatory arbitrage. Major providers have taken advantage of this ‘facility’, but 
it is also being used by dozens of very small master trusts. TPR estimates that 
there are 70 master trusts in existence. It has expressed concerns about conflicts 
of interest and also the low entry barriers when compared with the requirements 
under the FCA to set up a new insurance company. 
The Law Commission’s main focus was the opaque world of investment 
intermediaries, which, the Commission said, might engage in short-term churning 
of assets to further their own financial objectives rather than those of investors – a 
point that echoes the concerns raised in Caveat Venditor and the OFT report about 
misaligned incentives in the supply chain. The Law Commission did not say that 
each party in the asset management value chain had to take specific responsibility 
for member outcomes, but that there needs to be an identifiable fiduciary that 
acts for member interests. The analysis considered the legal distinctions between 
contract- and trust-based schemes and found that for the former, in the absence of 
trustees, ‘the law is much less certain’. It said that there were ‘no clear legal duties 
on [contract-based] pension providers to act in the best interests of their members 
or to reassess the suitability of investment strategies over time’. 
It concluded that the law cannot resolve all of these problems and that robust 
regulation is crucial: 
In the case of workplace DC pension schemes, we think legal duties are insufficient 
on their own to ensure good outcomes for members …  regulation must take the lead 
in protecting pension scheme members’ interests. Judge-made laws, such as fiduciary 
duties, cannot make up for gaps in regulation. 
No doubt the Law Commission will examine contract-based schemes in relation 
to the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations (UCCTR, 1999) and 
17 DWP, Pension Landscape and Charging, 2012, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/193451/rrep804.pdf 
18 The implication of this is that the FCA’s Conduct of Business regulatory regime does not appear to 
be fit for purpose when the customer is not the end beneficiary.
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the Unfair Contract Terms Act (UCTA, 1977), which are in the process of being 
consolidated and clarified in new legislation, the Consumer Bill of Rights.19 The 
new law aims to address, among other issues, the ‘risk of detriment to consumers 
accepting unclear contract terms which turn out to be unfair’. Employees who 
joined employer schemes under the voluntary system were unlikely to have read 
and understood their contract terms: they simply joined ‘the company pension 
scheme’. Nevertheless, they are treated as though they have explicitly consented 
to these terms and their consent is further required to transfer funds to a modern 
default fund in a lower-charging scheme. Under auto-enrolment, contract-based 
arrangements appear to be even less satisfactory, as employees are enrolled 
without their explicit consent, so there is only an assumed contract. 
Under UCCTR, ‘unfair’ is defined as follows:
•	 if a contract has not been individually negotiated, and
•	  the term causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations, 
then
•	 the term is contrary to the requirement of good faith.
Regulation 8 provides that an unfair term ‘shall not be binding upon the 
consumer’. It is to be hoped that a re-evaluation of older contracts would 
make it easy for members of schemes with higher charges to transfer assets to 
their new schemes or to an aggregator – preferably via a guided process that 
automatically checked old contract terms. This process should also deal with 
schemes that, by modern standards, have an inappropriate investment strategy 
(e.g, they have no de-risking glide path). 
The two features – charges and investment – are closely connected. Ten 
years ago, in 2004, the Pensions Institute published Delivering DC: Barriers 
to Participation in the Company-Sponsored Pensions Market, which said that 
schemes sold by commission-based advisers to SMEs frequently were selected 
on the basis of the commission level, rather than on the quality of the default 
fund.20 To be fair to advisers, at this time the default funds of the life offices 
looked very similar if not identical, while asset management was almost always 
an in-house function. These funds were described as ‘actively managed’ and 
‘balanced’, but a closer look revealed funds that many were closet trackers, 
typically 80% in equities, which suggests that the fund managers who charged 
active fees were being overpaid. The asset allocation was ‘static’ and in some 
cases did not include a de-risking period in the glide path in the run up to 
retirement. Where the fund did de-risk, typically this was over three or five years. 
For a member of such a fund, who retired in 2013, a de-risking period of five 
years would have started in 2008 (2010 for a three-year de-risking period). 
The fund value would have plummeted in 2008, just as the move out of equities 
began. The fund would have switched into bonds that were very expensive to buy 
as a result of the quantitative easing strategy adopted by the Bank of England 
in response to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). As a result, the fund value in 
19 The Unfair Contract Terms Act (1977, UCTA), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1977/50;  
The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations (1999), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
uksi/1999/2083/pdfs/uksi_19992083_en.pdf; The Consumer Bill of Rights: Proposals on Unfair 
Contract Terms, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/206437/bis-13-909-consumer-rights-bill-proposals-on-unfair-contract-terms-impact.pdf 
20 http://www.pensions-institute.org/reports/deliveringDC.pdf
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2013 would have been much lower than before the GFC. To make matters even 
worse, the member would be buying an annuity to provide the pension at a time 
when annuity rates were at an all-time low. We believe that expert independent 
governance and good scheme design would have helped to mitigate these 
unfortunate member impacts. 
1.3 What are the member charges?
The subject of charges and their disclosure is contentious, not least because 
disclosure is targeted at members in contract-based schemes, as it would be for 
any retail product, even though the member cannot be expected to understand 
the charges and their impact, and has no say in the choice of scheme or its costs. 
The member is the least able party to the scheme to understand the charges. Smaller 
employers and trustees of smaller schemes are no better in my experience. The 
government has asked ‘who needs this information’ [charges disclosure]? The answer 
is ‘those who can reasonably act upon this information’, but it’s not necessarily clear 
who these experts are. EBC
Disclosure is a complex subject and relates to both the fund costs and the cost of 
scheme membership – i.e., the ‘product’ or package costs – which include many 
other component parts, such as member account administration. There has been 
resistance in certain parts of the market to full disclosure at fund level. It has been 
argued that full disclosure is technically impracticable.21 It has also been argued if 
members knew the full cost of scheme membership, they would either opt out or 
choose a cash fund over the main default fund, as the costs would appear lower. 
We do not find such arguments persuasive. We would argue that the principle of full 
transparency is paramount and that there is little point in comparing charges or in 
setting a charge cap where the measure used for charges is seriously incomplete. 
Schemes and asset managers are boasting that they are so low cost they can’t make a 
profit. This is nonsense – all that low charges tell us is that the real asset management costs 
are going out of the funds before the member charge is extracted. Independent consultant
A charge cap on an incomplete disclosure measure would not just be pointless, it 
would actively encourage greater opacity at fund level and drive bad practice in the 
asset management community. EBC
If all charges earned are not included in the charges cap, it is easy to see fund 
managers using alternative sources of revenue [e.g. soft commissions], as well as stock-
lending, to replace the fees lost from a reducing AMC. It will be hard for fiduciaries 
to either see this going on or do much about it. We should not underestimate the 
ingenuity of the financial services industry. Any opportunity for a loophole will be 
taken so it is important that a ‘cover-all’ clause is inserted in legislation that addresses 
both the spirit as well as the specifics of the legislation. EBC
21 The IMA draft Statement of Recommended Practice (SORP) proposes that fund managers should 
declare the following transaction costs: transfer taxes, commission (execution), commission (research), 
and, amounts recovered on units issued and cancelled. However, it does not suggest publication 
of the following transaction costs: the transaction costs incurred by underlying funds; the profits 
made by funds when stock-lending is undertaken; and interest retained by fund managers on cash 
balances. It makes it optional to declare the average portfolio dealing spread and does not suggest 
publication of the portfolio turnover rate. See http://www.investinginfunds.org/assets/20120628_
EnhancedChargesDisclosureGuidance.pdf 
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Full and consistent disclosure, we argue, is simply good practice, but ‘to whom?’ 
is a separate and important question. Disclosure is only effective if the receiving 
party can act on the information and can understand what might appear to be 
anomalies.22 Clearly, a detailed analysis of charges is not a job for members or, 
indeed, for most SMEs, which are unlikely to have the time and necessary skill 
set.23 Instead, we argue that the analysis should be the responsibility of those with 
a fiduciary duty to act in the members’ interests, i.e., the trustees or governance 
board, which need to know what questions to ask and how to evaluate the 
information received. However, the skill set of such boards also varies and 
therefore we recommend that regulators should undertake the responsibility 
for ensuring disclosure is complete and presented in a usable format. We also 
recommend that all disclosure is made available via a central web-site, so that 
any party with an interest can examine the data. Effective governance at scheme 
and regulatory level, as described, should ensure that such disclosure is used to 
improve competition and to benefit members. 
The detailed breakdown of these costs is likely to be of no interest to anyone outside 
of a small coterie of experts. However, the cumulative impact of total billing is of 
interest to everyone and a single number demonstrating total costs for each provider is 
useful to employers and to the more interested employee. Actuary
Most [active] funds over-trade. There should be a fee structure that dissuades fund 
managers from trading unnecessarily. Where I am really uncertain is in the murky 
world of broking. We never get involved with that side of the industry. Are they 
[brokers] any good? Are their fees sensible or reasonable? Is competition effective 
in that area? Why do fund managers bother taking their research – shouldn’t they 
be doing their own? The failure to manage transactional cost at the fund level … 
provides a compelling case for Government intervention. EBC
At present, there are two main formats for product charge disclosure for pension 
schemes and plans. The annual management charge (AMC) deducted from 
member funds covers investment and ‘administration’, among other features. 
The total expense ratio (TER) is a more comprehensive measure of the member’s 
total annual cost than the AMC, but is still not complete.24 The TER comprises 
the AMC and fees for a range of services including legal, administration, audit, 
22 A good example would be the disclosure of transaction costs for real estate funds. Where the 
asset class is accessed via a fund of directly-held UK real estate, this would show the cost of buying 
and selling properties. Where access is via real estate companies, such as real estate investment trusts 
(REITs), such transactions would not be shown, as the fund would purchase equities in the property 
companies; therefore trading costs would be implicit in the price, not explicit.
23 According to one interviewee, full disclosure would include: bid-offer spreads (in particular the 
impact of the market on poorly managed trades); transaction costs of underlying funds when a fund 
invests in another fund; profits from stock lending retained by fund managers; interest on cash balances 
retained by fund managers; and FX spreads on currency hedging. One estimate of hidden costs has 
been expressed in ‘the Plexus Iceberg’ diagram, after a piece of research by the Plexus Group in 2005. 
The research breaks down costs as follows: visible costs = 9 bps; bid-offer spread, market impact costs, 
information leakage = 12 bps; delay costs = 21 bps; missed trade opportunity costs = 9 bps.  The 
visible costs (commissions, taxes, fees, custodial charges, etc.) comprise 18% of total costs. The hidden 
costs (bid-offer spreads and other costs due to market impact effects and inefficient market timing) 
comprise 82%. The hidden (underwater) costs are therefore of material significance. The Plexus Iceberg 
is discussed by Madhavan, A., Treynor, J.L., and Wagner, W.H. (2007) “Execution of Portfolio Decisions”, 
in Managing Investment Portfolios: A Dynamic Process, edited by Maginn, J. L., Tuttle, D.L., McLeavey, D. 
W., and Pinto, J. E. John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken (Chapter 10, pp.637-681).
24 In addition there is the ‘ongoing charge’. See http://www.investmentuk.org/current-topics-of-
interest/charges/. However, definitions of ‘on-going charges’ are drawn from EU law that applies to 
retail unit trusts. As far as we are aware, this measure excludes all transaction costs (including those 
of sub-funds). 
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marketing, directors’ fees, regulation and ‘other’. However, providers vary in 
what they include in each of these measures; in some cases a stated TER only 
includes an AMC. Moreover, while most schemes have a single charge a minority 
have an AMC and an additional charge, for example NEST’s contribution charge 
and NOW: Pension’s monthly administration fee.25 
Comparisons, therefore, are very difficult, and are made more so by the practice 
of underwriting employers ,i.e., agreeing different terms with different employers. 
Some providers offer the same charge to members irrespective of the employer 
and employee profile. Others underwrite each employer individually and, in 
general, impose a higher member charge where the membership profile is less 
profitable (and also, we were told, where the employer is less knowledgeable). 
The underwriting takes into account a range of factors, the most important of 
which are the earnings profile of eligible workers and the staff turnover rate. 
Most providers decline employers – for example, those with low-paid employees 
and high staff turnover rates – where they determine that they cannot make the 
required minimum return on capital within the AMC/TER. 
There are further differences that apply within an employer’s arrangements. 
Where an employer is advised to segment the workforce, there might be a 
difference in the member charge between the two providers. It is possible that in 
the scheme for the more profitable segment, members will pay a lower charge 
than if the whole of the workforce were in the same scheme. Schemes for the 
more profitable segments tend to offer a wider investment choice and more 
sophisticated member communications, which might include pension modelling 
tools, for example. Other variations include providers that reduce the member 
charge once the member’s fund reaches a certain size. 
A particularly controversial practice is the use of active member discounts 
(AMDs), where current employees pay a lower charge than deferred members. 
The OFT found that the median additional cost for deferred members was about 
0.47% a year and the DWP proposes to ban such arrangements.
AMDs do little good and are a long-term recipe for disaster – especially when applied 
in industry sectors and with employers where there is high staff turnover. We do know 
of one or two schemes where AMDs have been negotiated where the deferred member 
charge is under 0.75% (indeed on one scheme under 0.5%). If the policy intention 
is to remove AMDs for philosophical reasons then we say ‘just do it’. If the intention 
is to limit opportunities for funds to avoid the cap (by having active members below 
0.75% and deferreds above) then simply including deferreds in the equation will do 
the trick. To level the charges on schemes with AMDs, active member charges would 
typically have to increase by 0.25% EBC
Schemes have the right to change their member charge in future. Some providers 
– and these tended to be those with the same charge for all members – said that 
their long-term objective is to reduce the charge. Other providers – and these 
tended to be those with differential charges, depending on the employer profile – 
reported that they might increase the charge for future members if, for example, the 
membership profile changed or they did not achieve the anticipated market share.
25 While dual charging structures make comparisons difficult, they also raise the question of the most 
appropriate charging format. It could be argued, for example, that dual charging provides better 
value over the longer term, since the lower AMC is beneficial where the fund is substantial, whereas a 
flat rate embeds cross-subsidies from members with larger funds to members with smaller funds. 
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In Section 2, we look at the member outcomes from a range of default funds 
old and new. The purpose of the present section is to consider the relevance 
of the component parts of the TER in relation to value for money for members. 
The first point to note is that the asset management charge is not the most 
expensive reported item in a default fund, but typically accounts for 20-25% 
of the TER in a modern scheme. So, for example, where the TER is 0.5%, the 
reported cost of asset management might be just 0.1%. If this is genuinely the 
full cost, the implication is that the focus for member VfM should be directed to 
other components of the TER. However, it also underlines the imperative of full-
disclosure. In some schemes, a reported cost of 0.1% will be close to the full and 
true cost of asset management. In others, it will be a significant under-estimation. 
There are two issues we examined under charges. The first was the cost of the 
separate component parts of the AMC/TER.  We invited a representative range 
of modern schemes to provide details of the cost of these components, as a 
percentage of the total TER. Our full request for information was as follows:
•	 The cost of third-party services, including:
 ˚ Governance
 ˚ Trusteeship
•	 Regulatory fees / compliance costs
•	 Asset management (total cost of the default investment strategy)
 ˚  If your appointed asset managers engage in securities lending, what share 
of total revenue and costs is retained by the scheme for the benefit of its 
members?
•	 Asset management (including fiduciary / implemented services)
•	 Platform charge / fund administration
•	 Scheme administration and member record-keeping
•	 Set-up costs, eg:
 ˚ Design/implementation of the platform
 ˚ Payroll integration for employer compliance
•	 Member communications
•	 Marketing (including advertising)
•	 Distribution
•	 Other charges, including:
 ˚ Accounting
 ˚ Auditing
 ˚ Custody
 ˚ Legal
 ˚ Research
 ˚ Valuation 
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In several cases, we were given confidential information about the specific cost of 
the asset management component of the TER. In one case, we were told that the 
cost of marketing and distribution was borne by the provider. In most cases, we 
were told that all the component parts were included in the AMC or TER and that 
further detail was confidential.
The second consideration was what functions were included within the different 
component parts of the TER – our concern being that the non-asset management 
costs appear high relative to the cost of the investment strategy. This is relevant 
because providers might include costs – under ‘administration’, ‘marketing’ and 
‘other’, for example – that arguably the member should not have to bear. 
We were told that administration is likely to be the most expensive item under 
the total charge, accounting for 15bps to 35bps in a typical scheme, which 
is quite a substantial range.  Administration covers the costs of contribution 
administration, transfers in and out of the fund, annual member statements, the 
provision of a helpline, and certain regulatory costs, such as a per-member levy 
to TPR. These are clearly member services. However, our research indicated that 
administration, ‘marketing’, and ‘other’ costs can incorporate the cost of services 
to employers and to advisers. These services can be expensive to provide, 
of course; a good example being ‘middleware’, the software that enables 
employers to identify correctly the employees they must auto-enrol and the level 
of contributions. Indeed we were repeatedly told that employer compliance was 
the most challenging aspect of auto-enrolment implementation, especially where 
a high proportion of members opt out and must be re-enrolled, and where staff 
turnover is high.
We do not dispute the complexity of employer compliance, but we suggest that 
policymakers, regulators and those responsible for scheme governance should 
consider very carefully whether it is fair for scheme members to pay the costs of 
employer compliance, and, in particular, whether it is fair that they should pay 
for the services providers give free of charge to advisers in order to help them sell 
their schemes. 
We need to challenge every basis point in that member charge and ask whether it 
delivers value to members. Asset manager
One way of looking at this issue objectively from the employer perspective is 
to acknowledge that auto-enrolment represents an additional cost on labour. 
Assuming employers are not prepared to reduce their profits, there are only so 
many ways of recouping these costs, at least in part:
•	  Reduce the level of the employer contribution, where the existing contribution 
level is above the auto-enrolment minimum
•	  Reduce future wage increases (the model adopted in Australia, agreed by 
employers and trade unions)
•	 Pass on all costs to employees
The government should instigate an open debate on this issue to determine 
which is the most appropriate, economic and transparent method.
Finally on charges, it is crucial to address the overall ‘cost’ of periods of 
membership in older DC schemes, where the charges are high relative to 
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modern schemes and where the asset management might be suboptimal. We 
recommend a wholesale clean-up of older schemes and we do not think that the 
OFT-instigated audit of pre-2001 schemes goes far enough. A better solution for 
member VfM is to ensure that their assets in older schemes – including assets in 
the personal pensions of members who left a contract-based scheme – migrate 
to new schemes that offer demonstrable value for money, as defined in this 
report. A high proportion of these pots will be managed by consolidators (the 
‘zombie’ funds) that do not look for new business and therefore are under no 
competitive pressure to reduce charges and improve returns. As we mentioned 
earlier, we recommend that there is a guided process for employees with older 
DC pots – irrespective of size – that facilitates transfers to modern schemes that 
meet VfM standards, as set out in this report.
1.4 Who’s who on the sell side?
The changing shape of the provider market
In the late 1980s, when personal pensions and group personal pensions (GPPs) 
were introduced, more than 100 life offices, building societies and friendly 
societies sold DC products in the corporate and retail markets. The trend towards 
consolidation began in the 1990s and early 2000s and continued during the 
run up to auto-enrolment. In 2013, there were about 20 active players, although 
by the end of the year there were signs that several traditional providers might 
be on the point of closing to new business. Even within this comparatively small 
number, the research found very marked differences in terms of business model. 
Historically, the DC scheme market has been very fragmented, characterised 
by a very large number of schemes with small memberships. Of the estimated 
205,000 DC workplace schemes in 2012, only 5% had more than 100 
members.26 Schemes with fewer than 100 members accounted for 40% of AUM. 
We expect the auto-enrolment market to be dominated by a small number of 
trust-based multi-employer schemes – possibly five or six.  The period leading up 
to the end of 2018, therefore, represents a unique opportunity for providers to 
secure a viable share of the market. The short time scale for the market shake-out 
has triggered intense rivalry for business between traditional providers and new 
entrants. Moreover the distinctions between providers and advisers have become 
blurred. In particular, several EBCs and corporate advisers have launched their 
own schemes, while still retaining their ‘independent’ status,  
a situation which is permitted under the current regulatory system. 
Life office schemes 
Most life offices in the pensions market are proprietary companies; only a very 
small minority has retained the traditional mutual status or is not for profit. To 
date, life offices have mainly sold contract-based schemes, but several of these 
providers have launched trust-based multi-employer schemes (‘multi-trust’) for 
the auto-enrolment market. In addition, most life offices offer stand-alone asset 
management and administration services, while their asset management arms 
provide single and multiple asset class funds to (mainly trust-based) schemes on 
a third-party basis.
26 For DC market analysis, see Spence Johnson’s ‘Broad Brush’ reports, in particular numbers 7  
and 10: www.spencejohnson.com/TheBroadBrush.html 
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In 2013, the ABI listed the following 11 member firms (life offices) that provided 
qualifying auto-enrolment schemes:
•	 Aegon
•	 Aviva
•	 B&CE’s The People’s Pension
•	 Fidelity
•	 Friends Life
•	 HSBC
•	 Legal & General
•	 Prudential
•	 Scottish Life
•	 Scottish Widows
•	 Standard Life
The key distinguishing feature of life offices is that they have traditionally sold 
their schemes through EBCs and corporate advisers. This will continue to be the 
case under auto-enrolment, although we understand that some providers will 
also accept employers directly. Where they do, they might not advertise this fact 
openly, as they are anxious not to alienate the advisers on which they rely for the 
bulk of their business.
New multi-employer schemes (trust-based)
There are several new trust-based multi-employer schemes, the most prominent 
example of which is NEST, the government-established national scheme, which 
has a public service obligation to accept any employer.  The line-up in this 
market includes:
•	 B&CE’s The People’s Pension (B&CE is also an ABI member)
•	 BlueSky
•	 NEST
•	 NOW: Pensions
•	 The Pensions Trust
•	 SuperTrust
The key distinguishing feature of most (but not all) of these schemes is that 
they are not-for-profit organisations. Unfortunately, ‘not-for-profit’ is poorly 
defined and we would like to see better evidence of this status in relation to the 
distribution of surplus and member value for money.
Single-employer schemes
A third category is the single-employer scheme – typically, but not exclusively 
trust-based – which was already part of the landscape pre-auto-enrolment. In 
this case, the employer almost certainly would have provided a DB scheme in the 
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past, which is now closed, and uses the same trustee infrastructure to oversee its 
DC scheme. The default fund is likely to be constructed by investment consultants 
appointed by the trustees. 
The key distinguishing feature of single-employer schemes is supposed to be the 
strength of the trust board, which typically was developed for the DB scheme.  
However, DB skills do not necessarily confer DC expertise and can lead to over-
complexity in active investment strategy, which might not offer the best value for 
money for the membership profile. For example, we are aware of employers with 
high staff turnover and a significant proportion of low-to-median earners that have 
allocated 50% or more of the default fund to a diversified growth fund (DGF), which 
means that the member charge is likely to be well in excess of the 50bps available 
elsewhere in the multi-employer market. We are also aware of trustee boards that 
strongly favour active over passive management, which again results in a higher 
than average member charge and the potential for greater volatility in fund values.
Consultants’ schemes 
The fourth type of provider – the EBC or corporate adviser – is relatively new. 
Here the adviser constructs its own scheme and uses third-party asset manager 
funds for the default fund. We understand that the following firms offer schemes:
•	 Aon Hewitt
•	 JLT
•	 Mercer
•	 Xafinity
While the design of such schemes might be good, the entrance of advisers into 
provider territory has proved controversial, since the consultant still operates 
as an independent adviser to employers. In practice, the consultant would use 
a different arm of the business to deliver these two services, but this does not 
appear to have appeased opponents of the adviser-provider business model.
The use of third-party asset management
In theory, we might have expected the DC market to open up to third-party asset 
managers under auto-enrolment, but the research shows that manager participation 
in multi-employer  scheme default funds is limited because most of these schemes 
are run by vertically-integrated (bundled) providers.27 Notable exceptions include the 
consultants’ own schemes, described above, and the following:
•	  NEST outsources on an asset class basis to construct its default funds. 
Mandates include:
 ˚ UBS Global Asset Management Life Ltd: passive global equities
 ˚  State Street Global Advisers (SSgA): passive UK gilts; passive UK index-
linked gilts 
 ˚ BlackRock: sterling liquidity; diversified beta 
27 This issue was explored in the Pensions Institute’s October 2013 report, Returning to the Core: 
Rediscovering a Role for Real Estate in Defined Contribution Pension Schemes, http://www.pensions-
institute.org/reports/ReturningtotheCore.pdf 
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 ˚ Legal & General Investment Management (LGIM): real estate
 ˚ F&C Global Asset Management: equity portion of the Ethical Fund
 ˚ HSBC Global Asset Management: Shariah Fund 
•	  B&CE’s The People’s Pension outsources to LGIM for its lifestyled default fund 
asset management and to HSBC for its Shariah fund.
•	  The Pensions Trust and BlueSky outsource to AllianceBernstein, which in turn 
uses mainly third-party asset manager funds for its target date funds 28 
A small number of (generally passive) asset managers have strong relationships 
with life offices. Examples include SSgA, which provides the passive global  
equity fund for Scottish Widows’ default fund, and Vanguard Asset Management, 
which provides part of the asset management for one of Standard Life’s passive 
default funds.
The changing shape of the adviser market
As noted above, historically, the DC scheme market in the UK has been heavily 
intermediated, i.e., most life offices have sold exclusively through EBCs and 
corporate advisers. The distinctions between EBCs and corporate advisers have 
blurred over the years, but a broad-brush description can be offered as follows:
•	  Employee benefit consultants (EBCs): Often referred to simply as 
‘consultants’, these advisers also provide actuarial and investment consulting. 
Examples include the top three by size (Aon Hewitt, Mercer, and Towers 
Watson), the mid-sized consultants (e.g., Hymans Robertson, JLT, Lane Clark 
& Peacock (LCP), and Xafinity), plus regional firms. Also competing in the 
consultancy market are the accountancy firms, such as Deloitte, Ernst & 
Young, KPMG, and PwC.
•	  Corporate advisers: These firms are often referred to simply as advisers, 
although the term ‘corporate’ is used to distinguish them from the advisers 
that only operate in the retail market. We do not provide examples here, as 
many corporate advisers prefer to describe themselves as EBCs. 
There are several reasons why the role of advisers is changing and their number 
is likely to shrink: 
•	  Pensions are bought, not sold: The first reason is that pension schemes no 
longer need to be sold; employers must buy them and they can buy direct.
Previously, when having a scheme was optional, we had to pay advisers to bring 
employers to the table. Now the legislation brings employers to the table, it is not clear 
how our relationship with advisers will change. Scheme provider
Currently EBCs and advisers are evaluating their business models and are wondering 
if the writing is on the wall for their pension services. They are struggling to justify a 
role in a market where they no longer need to sell, but where employers are required 
by law to make a purchase and can do so from the factory gate. Scheme provider
However, while there has been a lot of talk about disintermediation, buying 
28 In this respect, AllianceBernstein provides an outsourced fiduciary or chief investment officer 
service, similar to NEST’s in-house function. 
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from ‘the factory gate’ requires providers to offer employer support to ensure 
they meet their legal duties. Schemes that will accept employers directly told us 
that they see a continued role for advisers.
The point here is that the adviser must offer genuine value in return for the 
employer’s fee and not sell services that are not really required and which extract value 
through the member charge. Scheme provider
•	  The choice of schemes will become limited: The second reason that the 
traditional adviser role is under threat is that the need for help in scheme 
selection will diminish over time, as the number of major providers in the 
market contracts. 
Employers needed advisers in the past because there were dozens of providers to 
choose from. If that number shrinks to half a dozen, it will be much easier for 
employers to make the choice without help. Scheme provider
•	  Joint ventures confer added sales power: Third, providers are securing 
distribution through joint ventures with EBCs, such as the agreement between 
Standard life and Barnett Waddingham, a mid-sized EBC.29 As a delivery 
vehicle in the SME market, this ‘decision-light’ consultancy model is likely to 
become increasingly common: it offers the provider distribution opportunities 
and it reduces the regulatory burden on the EBC, which otherwise would be 
required to undertake a thorough examination of each employer’s workforce 
and to select a scheme from the whole of the available market. 
•	  Web-based selection offers a cheap alternative: This is another ‘decision-
light’ option for SMEs. Here providers sell through web-based scheme-
selection services that identify the best scheme for the employer (from a 
panel) and provide an actuary’s certificate of employer due diligence in return 
for a one-off fee, e.g. £500.30 
Advisers can play a crucial role in promoting the scheme to employees, although 
under the voluntary system, this might have been to a segment of the workforce 
for whom the employer targeted employee benefits. In our 2004 report, 
Delivering DC, we found that advisers frequently were requested by employers 
to keep participation rates low to reduce the potential cost of the employer 
contributions. 
Under the new system, where employees are enrolled automatically, an 
important role for advisers is to encourage members to stay in the scheme. For 
this to work, they will need the support of the employer. Under the regulations, 
employers are forbidden from offering inducements to opt out, but they are not 
required to promote the benefits of staying in the scheme. 
Where employers will not pay for advice, we believe that the challenge of 
achieving high participation rates among smaller SMEs and micro employers is 
unlikely to be met by advisers, but will rely on the providers’ direct contact with 
members. 
29 http://www.barnett-waddingham.co.uk/ae/ 
30 The first of such services was Pension Playpen, run by First Actuarial,  
https://www.pensionplaypen.com/ 
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1.5 VfM for whom? Disconnections at every stage in the supply chain
VfM for members
The common factor that unites the DWP, OFT and Law Commission reports is the 
desire to understand and define what ‘good’ means in relation to DC pension 
schemes under auto-enrolment. We argue that ‘good’ should be measured in 
terms of value for money (VfM), which can only be evaluated where the beneficiary 
is clearly identified. This sounds an obvious point, but the research discovered that 
the identity of the beneficiary of a scheme’s value for money is far from clear. 
Logically, we might assume that VfM refers to the member, who is the investor 
and who pays for scheme costs through the TER. VfM for members of default 
funds might be summarised as a combination of the following factors: 
•	  A TER in the region of 0.5% a year for the accumulation period (at current levels 
of scale)
•	  A multi-asset default fund with a glide path that is subject to regular 
modelling scrutiny in relation to the member income replacement ratio (RR) 
and the downside risks.
•	 Expert independent governance fully aligned with all members’ interests. 
•	  Effective member communications that focus on improving the outcome, e.g., 
paying higher contributions, working longer, and/or delaying the annuity 
purchase date.
•	  An efficient consolidation system that helps members to transfer older DC 
pots to the new scheme, where these are held in poorly diversified funds with 
higher charges. 
•	  A decumulation service that is part of the scheme and provided by a specialist 
retirement-income adviser that adheres to robust service standards.
However, for providers, there are two other parties in the supply chain for which 
delivering value for money is a major consideration:
•	  The employer, which chooses the scheme, and which, in effect, acts as the 
unregulated agent of the provider and adviser (where applicable)
•	  The adviser, who sells schemes to employers on a fee basis and whose advice 
is also unregulated
We consider these two parties, in turn, in the context of the supply chain.
VfM for employers
We first considered the peculiar role of the employer in the supply chain in 
Caveat Venditor and said: 
The employer is the buyer, but not the customer; the member is the customer, but not 
the buyer, and therefore has no influence over the choice of scheme to which he or she 
is passively auto-enrolled. The employer has no responsibility for member outcomes, in 
law or in regulation.31
31 This again confirms why the FCA COB regulatory regime does not work for auto-enrolment.
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This was not the case under DB, where employers were the customers because 
they bore the bulk of the financial risks inherent in the scheme. Under DC, the 
employer is the ‘customer’ (purchaser), makes a contribution to the member’s 
pot, but bears none of the financial risks. There is a business risk, of course, but 
this does not apply to all employers; much depends on the size and age profile 
of the workforce. As we noted in Caveat Venditor, if employers do not provide 
adequate pensions they will lose control over retirement management, since 
employees will not be able to afford to retire and the law no longer permits 
enforced retirement based on age. However, where the employer’s workforce 
is characterised by high staff turnover and/or by a younger employee profile, 
retirement management will not be a priority and therefore this cannot be relied 
upon to change employer attitudes, certainly not in the short term.
From a supply-side perspective, the employer market can be divided into two 
tiers, which, from a pension scheme perspective, can be described as ‘traditional’ 
(with a history of pension provision) and ‘new’ (with no history of pension 
provision). Already, it is clear that certain providers and advisers will only or 
mainly deal with traditional employers and in some cases only with the larger 
companies. 
We are almost through our auto-enrolment workload and should be finished in early 
2014 when the SMEs start reaching their staging date. Some of the providers are 
saying the same thing – they expect to be closed to new business by 2015, possibly 
earlier. EBC 
The joke going round among the big consultants is that ‘auto-enrolment is so last 
year’ EBC
However, innovation among EBCs, for example in helping schemes to target 
member outcomes more effectively, might influence scheme design for SMEs.32
The traditional employer market
The traditional employers are the large and medium-sized companies that were 
pensions-friendly under the voluntary system because they believed that offering 
membership of a scheme was an essential component of their employee benefits 
packages. They still believe this, but not necessarily in relation to the majority of 
the workforce which must now be auto-enrolled. A key indicator of the attitude of 
the old-market employer is the pre-auto-enrolment scheme participation rates. 
In some cases, participation rates were high, but generally they were not, which 
indicates that membership of the pension scheme was perceived by employers 
as a valuable benefit for valued employees, i.e., the skilled long-stayers. In this 
respect, the employer’s objectives were well aligned with those of the provider 
and adviser, since steady and stable earners represented an attractive economic 
proposition. 
Some of the larger employers have a single trust-based scheme, usually 
designed by an EBC.  They might continue to use this for auto-enrolment, but 
there are reasons why they might review this decision in due course. At present, 
employers tend to use the trust infrastructure of their closed DB scheme for the 
 
32 For an example of targeted outcomes, see http://guidedoutcomes.hymans.co.uk/why-go/ 
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auto-enrolment DC scheme. Once they have eradicated the DB scheme from 
the balance sheet through a bulk purchase annuity buy-out, the cost savings 
from dismantling the trust scheme infrastructure and outsourcing the DC scheme 
might look very appealing. This is a worrying prospect, as one EBC explained:
Consultants with their heads in the sand think that the closed DB scheme market 
will last for ever. This is certainly not what TPR wants. It wants schemes to reach 
full solvency in about 10 years. Once that happens, employers will be keen to get 
rid of their schemes a.s.a.p. Great news for the buy-out market; not so great for the 
actuaries, the DB asset managers, the pension lawyers, and so on. 
For reputational reasons, the largest employers that have gone to the new 
multi-employer scheme market generally have introduced one scheme for all 
employees, although there might be a ‘nursery’ section for the first two years 
to deal with the segment of the workforce associated with high staff turnover. 
Medium-sized employers might take the same route, but providers in this market 
are also offering a different proposition based on the segmentation of an 
employer’s workforce, whereby the profitable employees remain in the existing 
scheme and the bulk of the membership is auto-enrolled into a multi-employer 
scheme that accepts most or all employee profiles, e.g., B&CE’s The People’s 
Pension, NEST, or NOW: Pensions. 
This cherry-picking approach to workforce segmentation on the part of 
employers, providers and advisers is likely to become a feature of auto-
enrolment in 2014. It is a supply-side strategy and is not necessarily driven 
by demand. Indeed, it is not clear whether the dual scheme structure is 
of real benefit to employers, particularly in the SME market, where the 
additional complexity associated with managing two pension schemes might 
be undesirable. What is clear, however, is that the strategy is of benefit to the 
providers in the SME market, some of which have publicly expressed concerns 
about the cost of delivering auto-enrolment across entire workforces where 
previously they had only served a small (profitable) section. Put simply, they 
do not want to deal with the lower contributions and higher turnover rates 
associated with many employees. 
While we understand the economics of cherry-picking from the provider 
perspective, from a policy perspective it is problematic. Employers with an 
existing scheme might reasonably assume that their provider will take on the rest 
of the workforce. This is not the case. We were told of examples where employers 
were being turned down, having assumed that they were ready for their auto-
enrolment staging date in 2014:
Employers are furious. Understandably they assumed they could rely on their existing 
provider and are finding out at the last minute they are not wanted. Unless they 
are prepared to run two schemes – and many are not – all their planning for auto-
enrolment has to start over. Scheme provider
Moreover, while diversification in providers’ business models is inevitable, it does 
raise potential problems for market analysts. For example it will be difficult to 
make any superficial comparisons between schemes used solely for the more 
profitable sections of the workforce and schemes that accept all memberships, 
since the former are likely to have higher employer and employee contributions 
based on above-average earnings.
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An additional practice that has been criticised is the provider’s implementation 
charge, which might be, say, £20,000.
We come across cases where everything was signed off and then the provider told 
the employer there would be an additional £20,000 for workforce assessment. It 
looks like providers that adopt this practice are hoping that the employers will feel 
committed and just pay up. EBC
The new employer market
The new market refers to employers that did not buy (or were not sold) a scheme 
under the voluntary system. Numerically this is the vast majority: of the 1.3m 
employers due to auto-enrol, nearly 1m have fewer than 10 employees. 
The objectives of new employers in the SME market are very different from 
those of the traditional, pensions-friendly employers. New employers are being 
brought into the market by the force of legislation. Most will have no pre-existing 
relationship with advisers and in many cases they will not be an attractive 
proposition.
There is a good reason why so many SMEs have not got a pension scheme – it’s 
because they were not perceived as attractive economic propositions, i.e. profitable, to 
commission-based advisers and to the providers they served. EBC
The chances that these employers will pay a fee to advisers are slim.
These employers are unlikely to pay a fee for advice. They will go direct to NEST or 
one of its competitors, which are set up to deal with employers directly. Even where 
these schemes gain business via advisers, this will be because they are being used by 
the cherry-pickers as a dumping ground for uneconomic sections of the workforce EBC
The dynamics of the supply chain are very different in this second tier of 
the market. For many of these employers, auto-enrolment will not be about 
providing attractive employee benefits (although employers might change 
their minds on this point over time). Instead, auto-enrolment will be about 
compliance with the new legislation: that is, they need to enrol and re-enrol 
the right employees at the right time at the right level of contributions. So this 
is a ‘minimum wage legislation’ scenario; not a sudden change of heart over 
employee benefits.
Accordingly, provider services to employers now include the provision of free 
pension/payroll software that identifies which employees must be auto-enrolled 
(and, for opt-outs, re-enrolled), the date of enrolment, and the correct level of 
contributions, which might fluctuate depending on the component parts of the 
wages. The term used for this function is ‘middleware’. Unless purchased as a 
separate piece of software, employers can get this service free from providers 
and also from many advisers, which means that in most cases the member 
charge covers the cost. We were unable to determine where this cost was 
positioned in the component parts of the TER, but believe it might be part of 
‘administration’, ‘marketing’ or ‘other’ costs. We question whether such practice 
is fair and suggest that it might undermine member value for money. 
However, it is possible that the problem will be short-lived. The research indicates 
that in future auto-enrolment compliance will no longer be perceived as a 
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pension problem that requires a pension solution, but as a payroll problem that 
requires a payroll solution. Payroll systems, already developed for the largest 
employers (usually on a bespoke basis) are now being designed for the mass 
market, so that employers of all sizes should be able to afford to update their 
software, with the possible exception of micro-employers. This still leaves the 
important matter of member communications, but we understand that providers 
are prepared to undertake this task. Providers are also likely to manage re-
enrolments where this function is not incorporated in the payroll software. 
No doubt the debate over which compliance functions are ‘pension’ and which 
are ‘payroll’ will continue, but we suggest that the government and regulators 
consider what SMEs need rather than what pension providers and advisers want 
to sell, and also consider what it is fair for the member to pay.
VfM for corporate advisers
Our research indicates a growing disconnection between the corporate advisers’ 
traditional role and the new requirements of employers in the SME market. This 
disconnection might not be apparent at present, partly because employers are 
struggling with the legal complexity of auto-enrolment as they prepare for their 
staging dates, and partly because the pensions industry is doing a very good job 
in convincing employers that auto-enrolment compliance is a pension problem 
that requires a pension solution. While this might be true in the traditional 
employer market, as we said above, for many new employers the real challenge 
appears to be getting the payroll software to deal with auto-enrolment. 
For corporate advisers, the timing of auto-enrolment is unfortunate because the 
Retail Distribution Review (RDR) came into force on 1 January 2013 – just a few 
months into the employer phasing period. At this point, advisers lost the right to 
sell schemes on a commission basis, an arrangement thought to be worth about 
£200m in the pre-RDR DC scheme market.33 
The market is currently best described as febrile. [Formerly] commission-based 
advisers are struggling to advise on workplace pensions and have reverted to other 
ways to create annuity [regular fee-based] business, typically through levying per 
capita charges to employers for assessing their workforces for auto-enrolment. This is 
increasingly leaving an advice gap for smaller firms setting up workplace pensions 
from 2014. The market has been slow to build alternative sources of guidance and 
support to allow the SMEs and micro employers to ‘stage themselves’ with good 
quality workplace schemes. EBC
Clearly the move from commission- to fee-based advice is also a problem for 
providers in the SME market which hitherto have relied on paying commission 
to secure distribution. Some would argue that before January 2013, if providers 
33 Commission on new sales was banned under the Retail Distribution Review (RDR), which came 
into force on 1 January 2013 (http://www.fsa.gov.uk/rdr). The ban on the consultancy charge 
was announced shortly afterwards by the government in (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
government-announces-clampdown-on-pension-charges). Commission was embedded in the 
member’s AMC as an annual percentage, which might be significant in the first year of membership 
(e.g. 20%) and then continue as a ‘trail’ commission of 0.5-1%. Trail commission is still embedded 
in the AMC of members of schemes sold pre-RDR, and applies to new members auto-enrolled into 
these older schemes after January 2013. The government is likely to exclude schemes with embedded 
trail commission from being used for auto-enrolment. The source for the figure of £200m was 
Deloitte, quoted in Corporate Adviser November 2013.
VfM 
wanted to increase market share, they could increase the commission rate. 
‘Commission wars’ have led to scheme churn – the last being in 2012 before the 
commission ban came into force. 
If the FCA wanted to discover the extent of scheme churn in 2012, all it has to do 
is look at the accounts of the corporate advisers in the market. Why hasn’t it done 
this? EBC
The government has proposed a ban on commission-based schemes used for 
auto-enrolment. This would have a significant effect on advisers and providers:
The impact [of a commission ban] on advisers reliant on commission would be severe. 
Much future commission is already baked into business projections, if not into the 
balance sheet. A ban on commission would materially impact the corporate advisery 
market and drive many commission based advisery firms into administration. EBC
Commission does represent a barrier to switching as advisers still have a strong 
influence on their clients. Advisers tell us that employers like commissions. This is a 
weak argument as commissions simply allow a pass-on of advisery fees from employer 
to employee. This practice has recently been extended to fund the administrative costs 
of auto-enrolment where the normal charge levied by the adviser is offset against 
future commissions. Scheme provider
To help secure distribution in the fee-based advice market, providers have 
designed ‘middleware’ as an adviser service to the employer, but which will also 
‘double-up as a fee-charging solution’ according to one provider that makes the 
software available free to advisers. The fee-charging solution includes ‘issues’ 
and ‘tasks’ the adviser would hope to address and complete in return for a fee 
per item calculator.
Of course, the middleware might offer much more than compliance, where it 
forms part of a benefits platform, but if compliance is all employers need, then 
there might be much cheaper ways to meet their needs. 
1.6 Member VfM and regulation
Good governance is the key to member VfM, as defined in this report. Good 
governance, in turn, requires good regulation, by which we mean consistent 
regulation across the whole DC workplace scheme market that has a clear focus 
on member value for money and the responsible fiduciaries. 
At present, we have a dual regulatory system and already there is strong 
evidence of regulatory arbitrage in the form of certain master trusts where the 
provider is the asset manager and also where the provider is an ‘independent’ 
consultant. Such schemes might well deliver member VfM, but we should not lose 
sight of the underlying principles of good governance, since smaller master trusts 
might prove to be hugely conflicted to the members’ detriment.
We would argue that it is time for the government to confront the issue of 
pension regulation – otherwise the best it can hope to achieve is to paper over 
the governance cracks as they become visible. The current dual system of 
regulation whereby The Pensions Regulator regulates trust-based schemes and 
the Financial Conduct Authority regulates contract-based schemes should be 
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reformed.  Without some reform, the implementation of auto-enrolment will 
continue to be based on the unsteady principle of ‘ready, fire, aim’.34
We turn now to an examination of charges and investment strategy – two of the 
key quantifiable components of value for money. We consider a representative 
range of default funds currently available in the UK and model their impact on 
potential pension outcomes for scheme members who end up in the default 
fund. We also consider examples of older funds that might no longer be sold, but 
which might still account for significant AUM.
34 Invented by Spike Milligan
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Section 2: Modelling value for money in default funds
2.1 Introduction
In this section, we present the results of modelling from the full spectrum of 
default funds currently used for workplace DC pension schemes.  We believe 
these funds are representative of the funds that will be used by the majority of 
employers for auto-enrolment: balanced managed funds sold by life offices in 
the 1990s (denoted by the label ‘1990’ in the tables and figures below), 100% 
equity funds sold in the mid-2000s (denoted by ‘2000EQ’), balanced managed 
funds sold in 2012 as auto-enrolment was being introduced (denoted by 
‘2012BM’), diversified growth funds (denoted by ‘2012DG’), funds designed by 
consultants for large single employers (denoted by ‘2012C’), and the new trust-
based multi-employer schemes designed specifically for the mass market that has 
been created by auto-enrolment (denoted by ‘2013ME’). 
We express performance outcomes in terms of the 5-percentile point (denoted 
the ‘lower bound’ below) and the expected value of the simulated replacement 
ratio (RR) – the ratio of starting pension to final salary – that could be achieved by 
participating in each fund. These are more meaningful performance measures 
than the fund size at retirement because they take account not only of investment 
costs and risks during the accumulation stage of a pension scheme, but also of 
the cost of buying a lifetime inflation-linked annuity, which provides a guaranteed 
income for however long a scheme member lives.  Moreover, the results can be 
applied to any earnings level.
Five thousand stochastic simulations of asset returns and member salary were 
generated using the PensionMetrics (PM) modelling software. We assume that a 
male employee is auto-enrolled onto his company pension scheme at the age 25 
with a starting salary of £26,664 (approximately equal to average UK earnings 
in 2013). For each year of his investment horizon, we assume that 8% (consisting 
of a 4% employee contribution, a 3% employer contribution, and 1% tax relief) 
of qualifying earnings (earnings in excess of a threshold initially set at £5,668)35 
are put into one of the funds. The nominal economic growth rate forecast is 
4.75% and the CPI (consumer price index) inflation rate forecast is 3.2%.36 
The growth rate of salary follows the economic growth rate with an adjustment 
for the member’s career salary profile, which is assumed to be that for an 
‘average’ male.37 Further details of the asset allocation strategies (AASs) and 
the charges are given in Appendix 2. Charges are deducted annually from each 
accumulating fund value as per its contract. At the end of the investment horizon 
of 40 years, the whole fund is used to buy a real (inflation-protected) unisex-
35 The threshold level of earnings for auto-enrolment were set at £5,668 in 2013-14.  This implies 
that in our example, the first year’s contributions are equal to 8% of qualifying earnings of £20,996 
(£26,664  – £5,668), i.e., £1,679.68. We assume that both earnings and the threshold are indexed 
to real salary growth. The contribution rate is rate is therefore equivalent to 6.299% of gross earnings 
(i.e., £1,679.68 ÷ £26,664) in the first year. 
36 Source: Appendix A, ‘Scenarios Tested’ in ‘A Validation of the Methodology used in the 
Department for Work and Pensions’ Ipen Model’, DWP Working Paper 106, 2012 (research.dwp.gov.
uk/asd/asd5/WP106.pdf)
37 For more details on the calibration of the career salary profile, see Blake, D., Cairns, A. J. G. 
and Dowd, K.  (2007) “The Impact of Occupation and Gender Differences on Defined-Contribution 
Pension Plans”, Geneva Papers, 32, pp. 458-482.
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priced annuity at the current annuity rate.38  The PM model used 5,000 Monte 
Carlo simulation trials per fund where each trial involved a different trajectory for 
asset returns over the relevant investment horizon.39 The means, variances and 
covariances assumptions for asset returns were provided by RiskLab.
The two key features that influence our results – and hence reflect value for 
money –  are the charges and asset allocations (including the de-risking glide 
path). We comment briefly on these features.
2.2 Default fund charges
In Caveat Venditor, we described the complex charging structures that result in 
a TER of 3% a year for older funds. Higher charges of up to 4% a year were 
encountered in that study. Modern funds have much lower explicit charges, but, 
in some cases, these disguise higher implicit charges, as the recent Lane Clark 
& Peacock report discovered in the case of diversified growth funds, where the 
cost of investing in sub-funds could add 50% to the headline rate.40 LCP’s 2012 
report also noted the different charges that apply to the same funds, depending 
on the access route. For example, a large trust-based scheme that buys a fund 
direct from the asset manager might pay less than half the price a stakeholder 
scheme pays for the same fund. 
A further issue that has a significant impact on the final pension is the impact 
of changing jobs. In the quantitative modelling results reported below, we have 
assumed continuous membership of the same fund for 40 years. In practice, 
many employees change jobs quite frequently and therefore will belong to 
several schemes. If a fund provider imposes an exit charge on transfers, clearly 
this will reduce the final pension. The same is true in the case of the common 
practice of increasing charges on funds where contributions cease, which 
continues today in the form of ‘deferred member penalties’. In short, job changes 
tend to lead to lower DC pensions (other things equal) – just like they do with 
DB pensions – challenging the supposed full portability of DC pensions, a key 
reason for their introduction in the 1980s.41
38 We have assumed for modelling purposes that the full fund is used to buy an annuity to provide 
retirement income, even though every member has the right to use 25% of the fund to take a cash-
free lump sum and that many of the default fund’s de-risking glide paths assume that this right will be 
exercised (i.e., the glide paths end up with a fund which is invested 75% in bonds and 25% in cash). 
Our rankings of the different funds are not sensitive to whether we assume that the whole or just 75% 
of the fund is annuitized. They are also not sensitive to whether the annuity is index-linked or not. 
 
39 We also chose not to report other financial risk measures. For example, the standard deviation 
of investment returns does not convey any useful information about either the probability of failing 
to achieve a target RR or the likely size of the RR if the fund is below the target. Similarly, measures 
such as tracking error relative to an index are flawed because risk is considered without reference 
to the real implicit liability in a DC scheme, namely the member’s pension in retirement. As one 
asset manager put it, ‘How can we have a conversation about quantifying and mitigating risk, if we 
can’t agree on the base position by which we are measuring risk?’ In short, we believe that the only 
sensible base position for measuring risk is to look at the distribution of replacement ratios.
40 See www.lcp.uk.com/news--publications/news/2012/pa/lack-of-clarity-on-dc-pension-fees-
prevails-as-additional-costs-increase-total-charges-by-as-much-as-50perc-says-new-lcp-report--1/. 
For the 2013 report, see http://www.lcp.uk.com/media/615166/lcp_investment_management_fees_
survey_2013_web.pdf 
41 Appendix 3 shows the results with shorter investment horizons.
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2.3 Asset allocation and the de-risking glide path
An important feature of the modern consultant-designed and trust-based multi-
employer schemes is the dynamic asset allocation process. The older style life 
office funds have a static asset allocation: it is fixed at the outset and does not 
change, except during the linear de-risking glide path in the five or so years prior 
to retirement (although de-risking was not common in the very early funds).
It is clearly too early to judge the success of the new dynamic asset allocation 
strategies, but the principle of investment risk management in DC schemes – the 
equivalent of liability-driven investing in defined benefit schemes – is a sound 
one. This because it enables those responsible for governance to act promptly 
to address issues such as a change in the economic or investment climate, or 
a change in taxation or legislation. In addition, dynamic asset allocation can 
respond more flexibly to changes in member behaviour, for example a trend 
towards later retirement.  
However, we need to distinguish between dynamic asset allocation strategies 
that are specifically designed to manage investment risks or respond to changes 
in member circumstances – and delivered through an agreed investment 
governance framework – and dynamic asset allocation strategies where the 
manager has full discretion. In the case of the former, there is a prescribed 
review process and the scope for potential adjustments to the asset allocation is 
limited; in the case of the latter, the asset allocation reflects the individual fund 
manager’s judgement.
Our study only covers the former type of dynamic asset allocation strategies. 
Where such strategies are used, we have been given confidential access to the 
specific asset allocation strategy that the fund provider believes will be typical for 
each year of the plan. 
Another important trend in DC investment has been a greater use of 
diversification to reduce volatility. This is reflected in an increasing use of so-
called ‘alternative’ asset classes, such as real estate, private equity, hedge funds, 
infrastructure and commodities. The funds that use these new asset classes 
are known as ‘diversified growth’ (or ‘strategic blended’ or ‘new balanced 
management’) funds. However, the new trust-based multi-employer schemes, 
like NEST, also incorporate alternative asset classes. For example, in 2013 NEST 
introduced a weighting of 20% to ‘real’ assets. This was achieved initially through 
a 20% weighting to real estate, but in due course other real asset classes will be 
included in the weighting, such as infrastructure.
De-risking glide paths work in two main ways. The conventional method is 
‘lifestyle’ or ‘lifecycle’, where the member’s fund is gradually switched into 
low risk assets, such as bonds and cash. ‘Target date funds’ have the same 
strategy, but they operate on a cohort basis, so there is a fund for each cohort of 
members, depending on their expected retirement date, and the de-risking takes 
place on a discrete basis within each target date fund.42
42 There is a third model, ‘managed DC’, which provides each member with an individual asset 
allocation profile designed to meet the target lifetime income. This US model is a recent innovation in 
the UK and there are only a few examples at present. One example is the SuperTrust multi-employer 
scheme, which uses the managed account funds run by Dimensional Fund Advisers (http://www.
supertrustuk.com). 
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Glide paths were traditionally linear and deterministic, but some of the more 
recent providers’ glide paths – like the asset allocation strategy itself – are 
managed on a dynamic basis, so that de-risking takes place in the context of 
market movements.43 For schemes that target a specific annual return within 
a target date fund, this means that the glide path might start earlier or later 
depending on the realized performance of the fund in the preceding years. We 
provide details of the charges and some details about the asset allocations of the 
funds considered in this study in Appendix 2.44
2.4 Quantitative modelling results 
We begin by projecting the performance of our funds over a 40-year investment 
horizon. The results are shown in Tables 1-3. Table 1 presents the lower bound 
and expected values of the projected replacement ratio at retirement. The former 
varies from 6.1% to 11.1%,45 and the latter varies from 15.36% to 23.84%. 
Table 2 gives the rankings by the lower bound of the replacement ratio: by this 
criterion, the top ranking scheme is 2012ME9, the second best ranking scheme is 
2013ME6, and so on, and the bottom ranking scheme is 2000EQ. Table 3 gives 
the rankings by the expected replacement ratio: by this criterion, the top ranking 
scheme is 2012C3A, the second ranking is 2012C1A, etc., and the bottom 
ranking is 1990D. 
Table 1: Replacement Ratios after a 40-Year Investment Horizon
Retirement Replacement Ratio (%)
Scheme Lower bound Mean
1990A    7.18 16.92
1990B    7.61 16.37
1990C    6.88 15.88
1990D    7.31 15.36
2000EQ   6.1 18.6
2012BMA  8.37 19.71
2012BMB  7.5 17.09
2012DGA 9.72 19.01
2012DGB  8.66 16.51
2012C1A  7.49 23.04
2012C1B  7.06 21.18
2012C2A  7.91 21.72
2012C2B  7.42 19.98
2012C3A  7.46 23.84
2012C3B  7.02 21.88
2013ME1  9.71 20.14
2013ME2 9.78 19.85
2013ME3 8.42 22.25
2013ME4 8.88 20.58
43 This makes the glide path stochastic.
44 In a number of cases, the asset allocations were provided to us on a confidential basis. In other 
cases, the asset allocations are publicly available on the provider’s website.
45 A higher ‘lower bound’ implies lower risk.
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Scheme Lower bound Mean
2013ME5 8.21 18.55
2013ME6 10.4 20.23
2013ME7 9.58 18.25
2013ME8 9.22 21.37
2013ME9 11.1 19.17
2013ME10 10 20.43
Table 2: Ranking by Replacement Ratio Lower Bound
after a 40-Year Investment Horizon
Scheme Ranking
2013ME9  1 (11.1)
2013ME6  2 (10.4)
2013ME10 3 (10)
2013ME2  4 (9.78)
2012DGA  5 (9.72)
2013ME1  6 (9.71)
2013ME7  7 (9.58)
2013ME8  8 (9.22)
2013ME4  9 (8.88)
2012DGB  10 (8.66)
2013ME3  11 (8.42)
2012BMA  12 (8.37)
2013ME5  13 (8.21)
2012C2A  14 (7.91)
1990B    15 (7.61)
2012BMB  16 (7.5)
2012C1A  17 (7.49)
2012C3A  18 (7.46)
2012C2B  19 (7.42)
1990D    20 (7.31)
1990A    21 (7.18)
2012C1B  22 (7.06)
2012C3B  23 (7.02)
1990C    24 (6.88)
2000EQ 25 (6.1)
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Table 3: Ranking by Replacement Ratio Mean after a 40-Year Investment Horizon
 
Scheme Ranking
2012C3A  1 (23.84)
2012C1A  2 (23.04)
2013ME3  3 (22.25)
2012C3B  4 (21.88)
2012C2A  5 (21.72)
2013ME8  6 (21.37)
2012C1B  7 (21.18)
2013ME4  8 (20.58)
2013ME10 9 (20.43)
2013ME6  10 (20.23)
2013ME1  11 (20.14)
2012C2B  12 (19.98)
2013ME2  13 (19.85)
2012BMA  14 (19.71)
2013ME9  15 (19.17)
2012DGA  16 (19.01)
2000EQ   17 (18.6)
2013ME5  18 (18.55)
2013ME7  19 (18.25)
2012BMB  20 (17.09)
1990A    21 (16.92)
2012DGB  22 (16.51)
1990B    23 (16.37)
1990C    24 (15.88)
1990D 25 (15.36)
These outcomes are shown as a scatterplot in Figure 1. Movements in a north 
easterly direction indicate higher mean RRs and lower risk. The following 
schemes therefore lie on the ‘investible  frontier’: 2012C3A, 2013ME3, 
2013ME8, 2013ME6, and 2013ME9.46 Two points stand out from this chart:
•	 There is a considerable variety of outcomes – that is, the scatter plot is quite 
dispersed. This indicates that the choice of scheme makes a considerable 
difference to the member’s expected retirement income. The best scheme in 
terms of mean replacement ratio had a mean RR which was 55% higher than the 
worst scheme (23.84% compared with 15.36%). The best scheme in terms of the 
lower bound replacement ratio had a lower bound that was 82% higher than the 
worst scheme (11.1% compared with 6.1%).
•	 The modern schemes generally perform better than the older ones. The main 
reason is simply that the later schemes have lower charges. Thus, the higher 
charging schemes tend on the whole to offer lower value for money.
46 The ‘investible frontier’ is not the same as the ‘efficient frontier’. Along the ‘efficient frontier’, 
schemes can only increase their mean RR by assuming more investment risk and vice versa.  The 
‘efficient frontier’ happens to be further to the north east in Figure 1 than the ‘investible frontier’, 
given the risk-return parameters we have used. Nevertheless, we can interpret the ‘investible frontier’ 
as being the practical risk-return tradeoff frontier for the schemes in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Replacement Ratios: Mean vs. 5% Lower Bound  
(40 Years Contributions) 
The impact of higher vs. lower charges is illustrated in the ‘shooting stars’ chart 
in Figure 2. In this chart, annual charges vary from 0%, 1%, 2% and so on up 
to very high levels, but all funds are assumed to have identical charges at any 
time. The chart shows the ‘upper bound’, based on a total expense ratio (TER) of 
0%: this gives the limiting case as charges go to zero. The chart also shows what 
happens at the other extreme as well: as the TER gets very large, the outcomes 
fall back to the (0,0) axis as we would expect. It also shows some intermediate 
points where the annual TER is 1%, 2%, 3% and 4%. As a rough rule of thumb, 
each percentage point increase in the TER leads to a fall in the expected 
replacement ratio at retirement of about 20%, and to a somewhat smaller fall 
in the lower bound of the projected retirement replacement ratio. The chart 
therefore powerfully illustrates the effect of charges. It also shows for any given 
level of charges how close the different funds are to the ‘investible frontier’.
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Figure 2: Shooting Stars Chart 
(40 Years Contributions) 
We now turn to a different conceptual experiment. Suppose an individual has 
already been invested for 20 years in one of the 1990 vintage schemes, but 
decides to switch over to one of the better modern schemes, say, 2013ME8, 
for the remaining 20 years until retirement. What is the effect on the pension 
outcome? The answer is provided in Table 4 and Figure 3.
If he stays with the 1990A or 1990B scheme (where the annual TER is 1.5%), he 
gets a lower bound of 7.18 and an expected outcome of 16.92, in terms of the 
replacement ratio. If he had been able to invest in the ME8 scheme throughout 
his working career, he would get a lower bound of 9.22 and an expected 
outcome of 21.37. And if he starts with the former, but switches to the latter 
after 20 years, he gets a lower bound of 9.03 and an expected value of 19.83. 
This is on average 17% higher than if he stayed in the old high-charge scheme. 
The message here is that such an individual could still benefit considerably 
from switching across – although one should bear in mind that we have not 
considered any ‘exit penalties’ which might penalize him from switching. Such 
penalties would reduce but (unless they are grossly excessive) not eliminate 
the benefits of switching. The benefits of ‘catch up’ by switching from the older 
scheme to the newer one are even greater if he had invested in one of the 
1990C or 1990D schemes, where the annual TER is 3% instead of 1.5%. 
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Figure 2: Shooting Stars Chart (40 Years Contributions)
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Table 4: Impact of Changing Scheme after 20 Years 
 Replacement Ratio
Scheme Lower bound Mean
1990A/B 7.18 16.92
1990C/D 6.88 15.88
2013ME8 9.22 21.37
Switches from 1990A/B to 2013ME8 9.03 19.83
Switches from 1990C/D to 2013ME8 8.65 18.52
Figure 3: Replacement Ratios: Mean vs. 5% Lower Bound  
(Switches Schemes) 
The bottom line is that an individual in a high-charging older scheme could 
benefit considerably by switching over to a lower-charging modern scheme. A 
possible policy implication is that the government might be able to help improve 
outcomes by taking measures to reduce the barriers against switching over – for 
example, it might limit or even prohibit exit penalties. 
We now turn to our last conceptual experiment which addresses the question: 
how are outcomes affected if the member invests only for 20, 10 or even 5 years 
instead of the 40 years assumed hitherto? The results are given in Tables A3.1 to 
A3.9 (given in Appendix 3) and in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Artillery Barrage Chart
The tables give the exact numbers and also suggest that the rankings are 
very stable (but not perfectly stable) in the face of changes in the length of the 
investment horizons. However, Figure 4 gives the easiest-to-digest overall picture. 
This presents an ‘artillery barrage’ chart which has some striking results. 
The key result is that the longer the investment horizon, the further towards 
the north east segment of the chart the average member’s outcome lies. This 
is the segment with the highest mean RR and the lowest risk. The chart shows 
the benefits of investing over long-term horizons. If the member invests for 40 
years, his mean RR is between 15% and 25%, and the lower bound is between 
6 % and 12%. If he invests for 20 years, his expected replacement ratio varies 
between about 7.5% and under 15%, and the lower bound varies from under 
2% to just over 4%. If he invests for 10 years, his expected replacement ratio 
varies from 2.5% to a little under 7%, and his lower bound is well under 2%. If he 
invests for 5 years, his expected replacement ratio is around 2.5% and his lower 
bound is about 0.5%. Roughly speaking, doubling the length of the investment 
period (e.g., from 5 to 10, then from 10 to 20 years, etc.) approximately 
doubles the mean replacement ratio. There is also an approximate square-root 
rule in operation whereby the mean value of the replacement ratio grows at 
approximately the square root of the lower bound. Given that the mean RR grows 
approximately linearly with the investment period, we can then flip this result 
around: the lower bound grows at approximately the square of the length of the 
investment period. In plain language, a member who is concerned about his 
pension tail risk would benefit greatly by investing for a longer period of time. 
The ‘artillery barrage’ chart powerfully illustrates the benefits from compounding 
returns over long investment horizons. 
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2.5 Summary
We ended Caveat Venditor as follows:
…. history shows that the UK financial services industry does not readily reform 
itself. If it fails to respond to our most powerful finding – that high charges have 
a devastating impact on member outcomes – then auto-enrolment, the flagship 
innovation for private-sector pension provision, supported by all political parties in the 
UK, will be a failure. 
We have now provided the detailed quantitative analysis to support this 
conclusion. In particular, we have the following key findings:
 1.  The TER is a key determinant of the default fund’s outcome, which we express 
as an income replacement ratio (RR) in retirement. Of the funds modelled, 
the default fund with highest mean RR (23.8%) was 55% higher than that 
with the lowest mean RR (15.3%). This was largely due to charge differences. 
As a rough rule of thumb, each percentage point increase in the TER leads 
to a fall in the expected replacement ratio at retirement of about 20%, and 
to a somewhat smaller fall in the lower bound of the projected retirement 
replacement ratio.
2.  While the investment strategy has an important impact on member outcomes, 
it is much less important than the impact of charges. 
3.  There is a notable trade-off between risk and return, but it is only the low- 
charge schemes that lie along the investible frontier. In other words, while 
‘cheapest’ is not synonymous with ‘best’, there is no evidence that higher 
charges can ‘buy’ more sophisticated investment strategies that deliver 
superior performance. 
4.  Two types of fund tend to deliver above-average outcomes relative to 
contributions paid: single trust-based schemes, designed by fee-based 
consultants for large employers; and modern trust-based multi-employer 
schemes. 
5.  Individuals in high charging schemes could benefit considerably from 
switching to low charging schemes, unless ‘exit penalties’ are prohibitive. 
6.  Longer investment horizons generally deliver better average outcomes with 
lower risk. Roughly speaking, doubling the length of the investment period 
(e.g., from 5 to 10, then from 10 to 20 years, etc.) approximately doubles 
the mean replacement ratio. The lower bound grows at only the square root 
of the length of the investment period, approximately. In other words, VfM 
increases the longer the member remains invested (so long as charges are 
competitive).
The findings in this report reinforce the importance of some of the key the 
recommendations we made in Caveat Venditor (see Appendix 1).
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Conclusions 
The government has introduced auto-enrolment as a policy measure, but it is 
relying on the private sector to deliver it. During the early years of designing 
the auto-enrolment system, most traditional providers – the life offices – said 
that they would not cater for uneconomic employer and workforce profiles. To 
overcome these problems, the government introduced NEST, which has a public 
service obligation to accept all employers, irrespective of their economic profile. 
Ironically, since then private sector providers – old and new – have said that 
they will compete in NEST’s market, which has led to the launch of several 
multi-employer schemes that will serve most and sometimes even all employers, 
but which do not have the public service obligation. Also since then, the life 
offices have recognised that their traditional employer underwriting techniques 
– whereby the member charge is inversely related to both the member’s 
contribution level and the sustainability of contributions over the longer term – is 
anachronistic under auto-enrolment. At least one major life office has introduced 
a member charge of 0.5% a year for all employers, although admittedly it is 
difficult to determine the extent to which it might also ‘screen out’ uneconomic 
employers, via employer fees, minimum contribution levels etc.
For decades, providers have benefited from the endorsement of employers that 
promote workplace DC schemes (via bulk sales). They have also benefited from 
the substantial tax relief  on member and employer contributions, which often 
has been eaten up by member charges. Under auto-enrolment, these providers 
no longer have to ‘sell’ pensions to employees in the private sector, because the 
system brings employers – and therefore their employees – to the providers’ door. 
However, it is clear from research published by the Pensions Institute, the OFT and 
the DWP, among others, that most of these employers do not have the knowledge 
and understanding to negotiate a good contract on behalf of scheme members.  
We recognise that the government faces a considerable challenge. It is within its 
gift to change policy and regulation. It is not within its gift to force private sector 
providers to participate in a market they find uneconomic, particularly when the 
rules keep changing. The ‘ready, fire, aim’ approach the government has taken to 
pension reform means that thousands of employers will have reached their staging 
date in 2014 and chosen a scheme before further reform is written into legislation. 
Nevertheless, the government should have confidence in its ability to promote 
low-cost schemes where the governance is fully aligned with the members’ 
interests. It should also have the confidence to clean up the legacy DC market, 
so that the whole of a member’s accumulation fund is in a modern-style scheme 
with low charges. Such requirements will lead to major and rapid changes in the 
industry, which must be overseen judiciously to avoid market instability. 
Above all, both the industry and the government must promote the objective of 
value-for-money for all schemes involved in auto-enrolment. This is urgent for the 
reasons set out in this report – and all the more so given that SMEs are due to auto-
enrol in 2014-15 and micro employers thereafter. Ultimately, the success of auto-
enrolment will be measured by members’ trust in the system to deliver value for 
money. The government, the regulators and the industry must not betray their trust. 
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Appendix 1: Pensions Institute findings and recommendations 
in Caveat Venditor, October 2012 
Findings
1. Our investigation of pension providers, consultants and advisers reveals a 
dysfunctional market that can lead to severe member detriment, especially for 
employees in smaller companies.
2. Data on workplace DC schemes are unreliable because contract-based 
providers re-categorise scheme leavers as retail customers - that is, they are no 
longer part of the scheme. This makes it impossible to analyse what happens to 
‘deferred’ member charges.
3. Thousands of employees pay six times the annual charge that is available 
from the modern multi-employer schemes – a total expense ratio (TER) of up to 
3% p.a., or even more, compared with a long-term TER of 0.5% or less for these 
new schemes.
4. For a number of providers, there is a lack of clarity over charges and what 
precisely is included in the TER. Our research encountered examples of what can 
only be at best described as ‘disingenuous practices’ in respect of charge and 
cost disclosure on the part of some providers and advisers. These unfairly distort 
competition and strongly influence the ‘choice’ of schemes employers purchase.
5. Our findings from the quantitative analysis show that the retirement incomes 
of these in the high-charging schemes will be worth only about an average of 
50% of the income achieved by members in low-charging schemes after 40 
years of membership.
6. Our quantitative analysis also showed the default funds used for auto-
enrolment had very different risk and return profiles, with the highest-risk funds 
producing around 50% of the retirement income produced by the lowest-risk 
funds in the worst-case scenarios that we modelled, according to the downside 
risk measure we used.
7. High charges are disguised by massive complexity, but also by the Financial 
Services Authority47 (FSA) projection rates, which are unrealistically optimistic 
relative to performance post-2000 and are likely to remain so even when revised.
8. Unless older high-charging schemes are abolished, their use for auto-
enrolment – when up to 10m low- to median-earners often with low financial 
literacy join DC schemes – will lead to the UK pensions market facing a mis-
selling scandal on an unprecedented scale.
9. The long-term TERs of 0.5% or less for new schemes are the charges that 
members will pay if they remain in the scheme for a long period of time (at least 
7-15 years). If they only stay for a short period, the effective charges they will pay 
will be much higher in schemes with a dual charging structure (e.g., in the case 
where the scheme has a charge on both contributions/administration and assets 
under management).
47 Now replaced by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). 
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10. The extent of vested interest as well as the embedded behaviour or conduct 
of market participants suggests that the market will not reform itself in relation to 
older contract-based fund charges.
11. Charges are not regulated by the FSA or the Pensions Regulator (tPR); 
charges do not appear to form part of the qualifying scheme compliance 
process.
12. Advice to employers is not regulated by the FSA and tPR. This is a massive 
oversight on the part of the regulatory system:
•	  Caveat emptor and the FSA’s ‘treating customers fairly’ (TCF) regime assume 
that buyers understand the cost of their purchases. This is not the case, 
especially for smaller employers.
•	  Auto-enrolees are the customers but they are not the buyers because they are 
auto-enrolled into a scheme bought by an employer that might not understand 
the impact of charges. Auto-enrolees, therefore, are ‘buying blind’.
13. Large employers with professional advice have the scale and negotiating 
power to drive down charges. The same is true of the new trust-based  
multi-employer schemes. Smaller employers are disadvantaged by the supply 
and distribution system:
•	  Those with high staff turnover and a significant proportion of lower earners 
do not have access to professional advice. They are perceived as unprofitable 
(‘polluted’ in the industry’s language) by most advisers and life offices.
•	  If these employers happen to find their way to one of the new low-cost multi-
employer schemes, members are likely to end up with a bigger pension 
relative to contributions compared with employees in existing high-charging 
life office funds.
•	  However, there is no automatic default position for these employers that 
directs them to the most appropriate schemes. Under the original blueprint 
for auto-enrolment, this would have been the government-sponsored NEST, 
but industry pressure stopped this.
14. Even where employees are auto-enrolled into a low-charging scheme 
for future service, their older pension assets will continue to languish in high-
charging funds due to a dysfunctional transfer market for contract-based 
schemes:
•	  Exit charges act as a massive barrier to transfers, which means that members 
are trapped and frequently pay even higher charges when they stop 
contributions.
•	  ‘Schemes’ are in fact a series of individual contracts. This means that every 
member has to sign a transfer form – an extensive exercise that requires 
considerable communication and information resources, which smaller 
employers in particular do not have.
In the light of these findings, we made the following recommendations in the 
report.
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Recommendations
1. The ‘caveat venditor’ principle
•	  Caveat venditor – let the seller beware – represents a more appropriate 
principle than caveat emptor – let the buyer beware – for members of auto-
enrolment DC default funds and should be the overarching framework for 
auto-enrolment.
•	  This requires robust governance frameworks that embed a fiduciary duty to 
put members’ interests first.
•	  Caveat venditor should apply to all schemes irrespective of whether they 
are trust- or contract-based and whether they are run by providers with 
shareholders or not-for-profit organisations.
2. There should be a commonly agreed definition of the total expense ratio 
(TER) (or ongoing charge as it will be known in future).
The TER should include:
•	 annual management charge (AMC) by the investment manager
•	  additional fund expenses in relation to specific delegated charges not covered 
by the AMC (e.g., custodian fees; fund administration fees; accounting and 
auditing fees; valuation fees; distribution fees; legal and regulatory fees; 
directors’ and advisers’ fees) 
•	  all costs relating to scheme administration and member record keeping, 
whether these be expressed as a monetary or a percentage figure.
•	 advice to the employer or trustee, where this forms part of the member charge 
Any separate advisery fees invoiced by the consultant, but paid for by the 
employer/trustees rather than the member should be excluded from the TER 
calculation, because it is too difficult to assess whether the member is being 
impacted by these fees (for instance via a lower employer contribution rate).
3. The high charges on legacy default funds should be eliminated.
The high charges imposed by the older default funds which started in the 1990s 
or earlier should be eliminated voluntarily or via regulation.
•	  The starting point for the Pensions Regulator would be to reject, for scheme 
qualification purposes, any scheme that has high long-term charges relative 
to those offered by the new trust-based multi-employer schemes which have 
an annual long-term TER of 0.5% or less.
•	  The same point applies to default funds that impose exit charges, as this 
undermines the portability of member funds and therefore does not reflect the 
needs of the modern workforce.
•	  The government and regulators urgently need to consider the solution to 
member assets trapped in these older schemes due to exit penalties.
•	  They also need to consider changing the remit of regulators so that they can 
regulate charges explicitly.
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4. A ‘scheme’ should be a ‘scheme’, not a series of individual contracts
•	  The reclassification of contract-based workplace arrangements as ‘schemes’ 
would facilitate bulk transfers of members’ assets to lower-cost schemes.
•	  This would also make workplace DC market data more transparent and 
therefore subject to greater scrutiny.
5. A quality mark should be introduced for schemes that serve the ‘direct-to-
employer’ market and to accommodate ‘refugees’ from older high-charging 
schemes
•	  The current (long-term) TER of 0.5% or less, established by modern multi-
employer schemes, would seem to be an appropriate target for the auto-
enrolment market as a whole.
•	  This target should form the basis for a quality mark for schemes that have 
good investment governance built in, and which can be purchased by 
employers directly, without the need for advice, which adds to member costs 
and in the case of smaller employers might not be available.
•	 Quality-marked schemes should be available via a central website.
•	  They should be promoted as the natural home for smaller employers in 
particular that are new to the market, and used for transfers for employers 
with older high-charging schemes.
6. Regulatory reform
The current dual system of regulation whereby the Pensions Regulator regulates 
trust-based schemes and the FSA regulates contract-based schemes should be 
reformed.
7. Advisers to employers should be regulated in the same way as advisers to 
individuals
•	  In order to close a loophole that leads to member detriment, the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) should regulate advice to employers in the same 
way in which they regulate advice to individuals. Employers – particularly in 
the smaller company market – cannot be regarded as informed institutional 
purchasers and their decisions can result in unacceptably high charges for 
their employees.
•	  To improve their ability to regulate ‘conduct’ more effectively, the FCA needs 
to have a much better understanding of the behavioural traits – identified by 
us in this report – exhibited by the industry they regulate.
8. Projection rates should be credible
•	  When the FCA revises its projection rates for DC and other long-term invest-
ments, these should be credible and not give the false impression that members 
can expect a fixed return of 8% (or whatever the new projection rate is).48
•	 Triennial reviews would help to ensure projections remain on track.
48 In November 2012, the FSA announced that the illustrative projection rates would change from 
5%, 7% and 9% to 2%, 5% and 8%, respectively. The new rates come into force on 6 April 2014.
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9. Projections should be presented in a way that is meaningful to members 
Projected outcomes for DC default funds should be presented in a way that 
is meaningful to members, such as in the form of a projected real income in 
retirement or a replacement ratio, rather than in the form of a projected return 
on the fund or a projected fund size at retirement.
10. A measure of downside risk should be presented
Alongside a projected performance measure such as the projected real income in 
retirement or the replacement ratio, DC default funds should report a downside 
risk measure
11. The quality of data about the workplace DC market should be improved
There needs to be considerably more high quality data made publicly available 
about the workplace DC market.
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Appendix 2: Schemes considered in the quantitative modelling
This Appendix sets out details of the asset allocations and charges of the schemes 
considered in the Section 2 of the report. 
A2a. Pre-Auto-Enrolment Schemes 
The first set of schemes includes those typical of the period before Auto-
Enrolment: 
1990 Balanced Managed (denoted 1990)
We consider four 1990 vintage schemes: 1990A, 1990B, 1990C and 1990D. 
All have the same asset allocation:
•	 UK equities: 50%
•	 Overseas equities: 20% 
•	 Fixed income: 20%
•	 Cash: 10%
Where the scheme employs de-risking, the terminal asset allocation is assumed 
to be 75% long-dated bonds/ 25% cash (i.e., the scheme is funding for an 
annuity plus a 25% tax-free lump sum).
The funds differ as follows:
•	  Fund A involves no de-risking, and a charge of 1.5% of AUM a year 
throughout (1990A)
•	  Fund B involves a 3-year de-risking glide path, and a charge of 1.5% of AUM 
a year throughout (1990B).
•	  Fund C involves no de-risking, and a charge of 3% of AUM a year for 20 
years, then 1.5% of AUM a year for the remaining 20 years (1990C).
•	  Fund D involves a 3-year de-risking glide path, and a charge of 3% of AUM 
a year for 20 years, then 1.5% of AUM a year for the remaining 20 years 
(1990D).
Mid-2000s 100% Equity (2000EQ)
Asset allocation:
•	 UK equities: 60%
•	 Overseas equities: 40%
De-risking: a 5-year linear glide path, with a terminal asset allocation of 75% 
long-dated bonds / 25% cash
Total member charge:
•	 1.5% of AUM a year over 40 years
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A2b. Modern Funds/Schemes
We consider 20 modern funds/schemes:
2012 Balanced Managed (2012BM) 
These modern balanced managed funds are offered by insurance companies 
and by asset managers via insurers’ platforms.
Asset allocation:
•	 UK equities: 44%
•	 Overseas equities: 36%
•	 Bonds: 12%
•	 Cash: 8%
De-risking: a 7-year linear glide path, with a terminal asset allocation of 75% 
long-dated bonds / 25% cash
Total expense ratio (TER):
•	 0.7% of AUM a year
•	 1.4% of AUM a year
This combination leads to the following two defaults:
•	 Balanced managed with a TER of 0.7% of AUM a year, and a 7-year linear 
glide path (2012BMA)
•	 Balanced managed with a TER of 1.4% of AUM a year, and a 7-year linear 
glide path (2012BMB)
2012 Diversified Growth (2012DG)
Diversified growth funds are offered by insurance companies and asset 
managers. They can be used as a single default fund option, but are more 
frequently used as part of a multi-asset default fund strategy constructed for 
trustees and employers. 
Asset allocation:
•	 UK equities: 22%
•	 Overseas equities: 32%
•	 Bonds: 22%
•	 Cash: 12%
•	 Property: 3%
•	 Other (commodities, hedge funds, private equity): 9%
De-risking: a 7-year linear glide path, with a terminal asset allocation of 75% 
long-dated bonds / 25% cash
VfM 
TER:
•	 0.7% of AUM
•	 1.4% of AUM
This combination leads to the following two default funds:
•	 Diversified growth with a TER of 0.7% of AUM a year, a 7-year linear glide 
path (2012DGA)
•	 Diversified growth with a TER of 1.4% of AUM a year, a 7-year linear glide 
path (2012DGB)
2012 Consultant (2012C)
We consider three different consultant schemes that differ in their asset allocation 
strategies. The details were provided to us on a confidential basis. For each, 
scheme, we consider annual TERs of 0.3% and 0.7%. This gives us six combinations: 
•	 TER of 0.3% of AUM a year (2012C1A)
•	 TER of 0.7% of AUM a year (2012C1B)
•	 TER of 0.3% of AUM a year (2012C2A)
•	 TER of 0.7% of AUM a year (2012C2B)
•	 TER of 0.3% of AUM a year (2012C3A)
•	 TER of 0.7% of AUM a year (2012C3B)
2013 Multi-Employer Trust Schemes (2013ME)
We consider 10 different multi-employer trust schemes labelled ME1 to ME10 from 
seven providers. Their asset allocation strategies typically involve dynamic age-
dependent allocations. In most cases, the details of these asset allocations were 
provided to us on a confidential basis. These schemes involve AUM charges varying 
from 0.3% to 1.0% of AUM a year, and some also include contribution charges 
and/or fixed annual charges. The sets of charges for each scheme are shown in 
Table A2.1. The order in which these schemes are shown does not correspond to 
the ordering of their labels 2013ME1 to 2013ME10 in the charts and figures. While 
the NEST scheme and the two Now: Pensions schemes (with de-risking glide paths 
of 5 and 15 years, respectively) can be identified from Table A2.1, this information 
is not sufficient to identify them in the tables and figures in the main report. Further 
details are withheld due to the need to preserve anonymity.
Table A2.1: Charges on the Multi-Employer Trust Schemes
%AUM Fixed charge Contributions charge
0.50% 0 0
0.50% 0 0
1.00% 0 0
0.30% £18 pa 0
0.30% £18 pa 0
0.50% 0 0
0.30% 0 1.80%
1.00% 0 0
0.50% 0 0
0.50% 0 0
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Appendix 3: Quantitative modelling results for different  
investment horizons
This Appendix sets out Tables A3.1-A3.9 which give results for investment 
horizons of 20, 10 and 5 years, respectively. The member is assumed to join the 
scheme at age 25 and contribute for periods of 20, 10 and 5 years, respectively. 
At the end of the relevant period, contributions are assumed to cease, but the 
fund remains invested and standard charges are extracted until age 65, at which 
point a lifetime inflation-linked annuity is purchased.
Table A3.1: Replacement Ratios after a 20-Year Investment Horizon 
Retirement Replacement Ratio (%)
Scheme Lower bound Mean
1990A    2.25 8.52
1990B    2.35 8.23
1990C    1.99 7.47
1990D    2.08 7.22
2000EQ   1.4 10.01
2012BMA  2.57 10.85
2012BMB  2.1 8.88
2012DGA 3.48 10.3
2012DGB  2.85 8.43
2012C1A  2.12 13.41
2012C1B  1.88 11.96
2012C2A  2.4 12.34
2012C2B  2.13 11
2012C3A  2 14.14
2012C3B  1.77 12.61
2013ME1  3.09 11.2
2013ME2 3.39 11.03
2013ME3 2.32 12.91
2013ME4 2.69 11.61
2013ME5 2.33 10.06
2013ME6 3.93 11.23
2013ME7 3.39 9.732
2013ME8 2.96 12.25
2013ME9 4.13 10.45
2013ME10 3.73 11.26
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Table A3.2: Ranking by Replacement Ratio Lower Bound after a  
20-Year Investment Horizon
Scheme Ranking
2013ME9  1
2013ME6  2
2013ME10 3
2012DGA  4
2013ME7  5
2013ME2  6
2013ME1  7
2013ME8  8
2012DGB  9
2013ME4  10
2012BMA  11
2012C2A  12
1990B    13
2013ME5  14
2013ME3  15
1990A    16
2012C2B  17
2012C1A  18
2012BMB  19
1990D    20
2012C3A  21
1990C    22
2012C1B  23
2012C3B  24
2000EQ 25
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Table A3.3: Ranking by Replacement Ratio Mean after a 20-Year Investment 
Horizon
Scheme Ranking
2012C3A  1
2012C1A  2
2013ME3  3
2012C3B  4
2012C2A  5
2013ME8  6
2012C1B  7
2013ME4  8
2013ME10 9
2013ME6  10
2013ME1  11
2013ME2  12
2012C2B  13
2012BMA  14
2013ME9  15
2012DGA  16
2013ME5  17
2000EQ   18
2013ME7  19
2012BMB  20
1990A    21
2012DGB  22
1990B    23
1990C    24
1990D 25
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Table A3.4: Replacement Ratios after a 10-Year Investment Horizon 
Retirement Replacement Ratio (%)  
Scheme Lower bound Mean
1990A    0.79 3.67
1990B    0.83 3.55
1990C    0.63 2.97
1990D    0.66 2.86
2000EQ   0.43 4.51
2012BMA  0.90 4.96
2012BMB  0.70 3.92
2012DGA 1.31 4.66
2012DGB  1.02 3.68
2012C1A  0.70 6.34
2012C1B  0.61 5.55
2012C2A  0.81 5.75
2012C2B  0.7 5.02
2012C3A  0.64 6.79
2012C3B  0.56 5.94
2013ME1  1.06 5.14
2013ME2 1.23 5.09
2013ME3 0.74 6.12
2013ME4 0.94 5.41
2013ME5 0.78 4.57
2013ME6 1.47 5.16
2013ME7 1.23 4.36
2013ME8 1.05 5.75
2013ME9 1.52 4.74
2013ME10 1.39 5.11
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Table A3.5: Ranking by Replacement Ratio Lower Bound after a 10-Year 
Investment Horizon
Scheme Ranking
2013ME9  1
2013ME6  2
2013ME10 3
2012DGA  4
2013ME7  5
2013ME2  6
2013ME1  7
2013ME8  8
2012DGB  9
2013ME4  10
2012BMA  11
1990B    12
2012C2A  13
1990A    14
2013ME5  15
2013ME3  16
2012BMB  17
2012C1A  18
2012C2B  19
1990D    20
2012C3A  21
1990C    22
2012C1B  23
2012C3B  24
2000EQ 25
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Table A3.6: Ranking by Replacement Ratio Mean after a 10-Year Investment 
Horizon
Scheme Ranking
2012C3A  1
2012C1A  2
2013ME3  3
2012C3B  4
2013ME8  5
2012C2A  6
2012C1B  7
2013ME4  8
2013ME6  9
2013ME1  10
2013ME10 11
2013ME2  12
2012C2B  13
2012BMA  14
2013ME9  15
2012DGA  16
2013ME5  17
2000EQ   18
2013ME7  19
2012BMB  20
2012DGB  21
1990A    22
1990B    23
1990C    24
1990D 25
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Table A3.7: Replacement Ratios after a 5-Year Investment Horizon 
Retirement Replacement Ratio (%)  
Scheme Lower bound Mean
1990A    0.31 1.56
1990B    0.31 1.51
1990C    0.23 1.21
1990D    0.24 1.17
2000EQ   0.16 1.96
2012BMA  0.35 2.18
2012BMB  0.27 1.69
2012DGA 0.52 2.03
2012DGB  0.40 1.57
2012C1A  0.27 2.84
2012C1B  0.23 2.46
2012C2A  0.31 2.55
2012C2B  0.27 2.20
2012C3A  0.25 3.06
2012C3B  0.21 2.65
2013ME1  0.38 2.23
2013ME2 0.49 2.24
2013ME3 0.28 2.74
2013ME4 0.36 2.40
2013ME5 0.30 2.00
2013ME6 0.59 2.27
2013ME7 0.49 1.89
2013ME8 0.40 2.56
2013ME9 0.58 2.04
2013ME10 0.54 2.20
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Table A3.8: Ranking by Replacement Ratio Lower Bound after a 5-Year 
Investment Horizon
Scheme Ranking
2013ME6  1
2013ME9  2
2013ME10 3
2012DGA  4
2013ME2  5
2013ME7  6
2013ME8  7
2012DGB  8
2013ME1  9
2013ME4  10
2012BMA  11
1990B    12
2012C2A  13
1990A    14
2013ME5  15
2013ME3  16
2012C1A  17
2012C2B  18
2012BMB  19
2012C3A  20
1990D    21
1990C    22
2012C1B  23
2012C3B  24
2000EQ 25
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Table A3.9: Ranking by Replacement Ratio Mean after a 5-Year Investment 
Horizon
Scheme Ranking
2012C3A  1
2012C1A  2
2013ME3  3
2012C3B  4
2013ME8  5
2012C2A  6
2012C1B  7
2013ME4  8
2013ME6  9
2013ME2  10
2013ME1  11
2012C2B  12
2013ME10 13
2012BMA  14
2013ME9  15
2012DGA  16
2013ME5  17
2000EQ   18
2013ME7  19
2012BMB  20
2012DGB  21
1990A    22
1990B    23
1990C    24
1990D 25
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PensionMetrics:  
The Optimal Design of Defined Contribution Pension Plans
PensionMetrics is a software tool that can be used to design the best defined 
contribution pension plan for a plan member. For a given set of risk factors, 
a stochastic simulation model is used to determine the likely outcomes of the 
pension in retirement for different contribution rates, investment strategies and 
retirement ages. The model takes account of all relevant member characteristics 
including age, gender, occupation, prospective retirement age, other savings and 
investments, and longevity. The model can also take account of factors relating to 
the plan member’s spouse such as age and occupation.
The key risk factors in the model are:
•	  Salary risk: uncertain future salary, which affects the contributions into the 
pension fund. 
•	  Investment risks: those risks associated with uncertain investment returns in 
the pension fund.
•	  Interest rate risk, which affects both investment risks and the annuity rate at 
retirement.
•	 Inflation risk.
•	 Unemployment risk.
•	 Longevity risk: the risk of an uncertain future lifetime. 
PensionMetrics has the following unique features:
•	  Fully integrates the accumulation and decumulation phases of a DC pension 
plan.
•	  Recognises the importance of taking account of the member’s occupation and 
gender.
•	 Allows for a wide variety of accumulation phase or investment strategies.
•	 Allows for a wide variety of decumulation phase or post-retirement strategies. 
•	 Allows for longevity risk.
•	 Uses fan charts to illustrate the range of possible outcomes.
For more information, please contact David Blake on d.blake@city.ac.uk
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Sponsor Statement by B&CE, provider of The People’s Pension
B&CE, provider of The People’s Pension, is pleased to support this Pensions 
Institute ‘Value for Money’ report.
About B&CE
From an aspirational concept in 1942, B&CE has been providing financial 
benefits for construction workers for 70 years.
With over 30 years of pension scheme experience, and unrivalled expertise 
in delivering pensions to low-to-moderate earning transient workers, we have 
harnessed this to develop a compelling automatic enrolment proposition in The 
People’s Pension. With no shareholders, B&CE operates on a not-for-profit basis 
for the benefit of our members and their beneficiaries. 
The People’s Pension is suitable for any organisation or employer, large or small, 
in any sector. It is built on the three key principles: Design Simplicity, Employer 
Assistance and Employee Engagement.
Value for money
Pension schemes should be run in the interests of the member. Strong 
governance, simplicity and transparency are all pre-requisites to securing good 
member outcomes.
While charges are a key determining factor in the value for money equation, we 
also need to look at the benefits and service provided by the scheme. This can 
only be assessed when you have simple and transparent charges, so schemes 
can be compared on the basis of a common currency. This will ensure:
i) employers and members can make easy comparisons; and
ii) providers can compete on scheme quality and cost.
The recommendations highlighted in this report are a significant contribution 
to the debate in improving the understanding, and delivery, of value for money 
in pensions. The recommendation that regulatory reform is needed is a strong 
one. But this is more than just having a single pensions regulator. We need an 
independent oversight body, an Office for Pension Responsibility, that has the 
objective of improving the functioning of the pensions market by driving up 
scheme quality and ensuring fair competition between all market players. The 
challenges of bringing in an extra 5-9 million people into pensions for the first 
time through automatic enrolment, the weakness of the ‘buy side’ (as highlighted 
in the recent Office of Fair Trading report) and the regulatory confusion caused 
by having two regulators, all mean that the Government needs to act now to 
ensure there is proper regulatory and market oversight. To be effective, such an 
organisation would need to sit separate from, and be truly independent of, the 
Department for Work and Pensions’ policy activities.
We look forward to continue working with the Pensions Institute, with the aim of 
improving workplace pensions for all savers.
Jamie Fiveash, The People’s Pension, January 2014
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Sponsor Statement by Hymans Robertson
We are pleased to support this report, the publication of which couldn’t be 
timelier. Policymakers are seeking to improve the current DC environment for 
the benefit of all members and of course this should be welcomed. Thus far, the 
debate has focussed on the level of member charges.  This is a complex issue 
and the Pensions Institute presents an intelligent methodology to determine 
Value for Money for DC members. The pensions industry is riddled with 
vested and conflicted interests and the Pensions Institute presents a refreshing 
independent perspective.
The five recommendations of this report highlight the range of design and 
infrastructure changes required to improve member outcomes. Of course, 
changes to the delivery infrastructure alone, such as member charges, won’t 
deliver the supportive structure required to support individuals to achieving an 
appropriate income in retirement.
Currently, the management of DC plans is the responsibility of the individual. 
The reality is that the majority of individuals are ill-equipped to do this and 
attempts to foster a “DIY” approach are unlikely in the majority of cases to 
succeed. Most people aren’t able to manage their pension effectively and don’t 
engage with it. Our belief is that DC schemes should implement a change of 
direction, accepting that members need and would highly value more support. 
The solution should embrace the power of inertia through the scheme design 
and the methods adopted to engage should seek to enforce the right behaviour. 
This design should focus on appropriate income replacement rates and how 
to support members to achieve these. This point is highlighted by the Pensions 
Institute in the second of its recommendations. 
Hymans Robertson looks forward to supporting the publication of this report.
Lee Hollingworth, Head of DC Consulting
T: 020 7082 6324
E: lee.hollingworth@hymans.co.uk
www.hymans.co.uk
January 2014
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Sponsor Statement by NEST
Automatic enrolment represents a huge opportunity to re-build the public’s 
trust in financial services. Providing value for money that stands up to scrutiny 
is a vital part of laying new foundations with consumers, which is why NEST is 
pleased to be involved in developing this report. 
NEST is a defined contribution pension scheme that UK employers can use to 
meet their new legal duties. It’s an easy-to-use, low-charge scheme that has a 
public service obligation to accept employers of any size or sector that want to 
use it.
Our scheme is just part of the new pensions landscape where saving for 
retirement is no longer a predominantly voluntary pursuit, and the profile of 
those saving for their retirement is changing radically. Against this backdrop of 
millions of people new to saving and investing, there is significant responsibility 
to ensure the interests and expectations of those involved in any element of 
selecting, advising, governing or implementing schemes are not at odds with 
those of the end saver.
The norms associated with traditional pension saving are doubtless changing. 
In particular, we support this report’s challenge to the long-held suggestion by 
certain elements of the investment chain that savers always get what they pay 
for - that is, that better outcomes are the inevitable outcome of higher charging 
schemes. There is a greater appreciation in today’s world that both the opposite 
is more likely to be true and also that schemes, including NEST, designed to 
help employers meet their new duties under automatic enrolment can deliver 
high quality, well-diversified and carefully risk-managed defaults, as well as 
additional fund choices, at low cost.
There is also a widening recognition that low cost does not simply mean low 
AMC or equivalent. Smart delivery that works to reduce the potential drag on 
performance of investment costs that are typically hidden from savers is a vital 
part of the value for money, aligning interests and re-building trust enterprise.
For NEST’s part, the delivery structure of our default range of 47 single-year 
target date funds, the NEST Retirement Date Funds, creates a de facto internal 
market. This allows us to reduce the drag on performance caused by transaction 
costs.
NEST is among the many schemes working hard to deliver genuine value for 
money and evolve our offer to savers in order to secure better outcomes over 
many generations, and play our part in earning and retaining the trust of savers.
Mark Fawcett, NEST CIO, 
January 2014
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Sponsor Statement by NOW: Pensions 
“Value for money” is a phrase often used in relation to pensions but no work has 
ever been undertaken to define its meaning. 
The VfM report follows on from the Pensions Institute at Cass Business School‘s 
Caveat Venditor Report in 2012 which NOW: Pensions also sponsored. This was a 
step-changing report and created debate within the industry on issues that need 
to be tackled to improve pensions in the UK.  
It clearly showed how charges significantly impact the outcome for savers and 
highlighted the conflict in the buying process in that whilst the employee is 
ultimately the customer, it is the employer who chooses the pension arrangement 
and hence is the buyer. Therefore the onus should be on the seller or the scheme 
provider to take responsibility for ensuring that the scheme delivers.
This report takes the debate further in examining how auto enrolment will change 
the UK pensions landscape, but most importantly it explores what value for 
money actually means and how it can be gained for the millions of employees 
who are being auto enrolled, but who make no decision in the purchase. 
When NOW: Pensions entered the UK market in 2011, our overriding aim was 
to build a proposition that focussed solely on the member – to give people in 
the UK the pension they deserved. Over the past two years, we have been vocal 
about the need for standards in the industry to improve and in defining, for the 
first time, what constitutes value for money for members, this report makes an 
important contribution both to the industry and the ongoing regulatory debate. 
It is apparent that while cost is a key determinant, other elements are of equal 
importance such as a well-designed default fund, strong governance and a 
good decumulation service. The report also emphasises how scheme design and 
communication should focus on the income replacement ratio, rather than simply 
the size of the pension pot as this is the only meaningful measure of the member 
outcome.  
It is clear that much work remains to be done if the industry is to deliver what it 
“says on the tin”- ensuring that we provide value for money to members so that 
they are able to retire on an adequate income. 
NOW: Pensions support the recommendations of this report as if all schemes 
adhered to these principles, we would have a much greater chance of 
establishing an industry which we can be proud of and that serves the people it is 
supposed to serve, the members of the pension schemes. 
NOW: Pensions,
January 2014
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About the Pensions Institute
The objectives of the Pensions Institute are:
•	  to undertake high quality research in all fields related to pensions
•	  to communicate the results of that research to the academic and practitioner 
communities
•	  to establish an international network of pensions researchers from a variety of 
disciplines
•	  to provide expert independent advice to the pensions industry and government.
We take a fully multidisciplinary approach. For the first time disciplines such 
as economics, finance, insurance and actuarial science through to accounting, 
corporate governance, law and regulation have been brought together in order 
to enhance strategic thinking, research and teaching in pensions. As the first and 
only UK academic research centre focused entirely on pensions, the Pensions 
Institute unites some of the world’s leading experts in these fields in order to offer 
an integrated approach to solving the complex problems that arise in this field.  
The Pensions Institute undertakes research in a wide range of fields, including:
Pension microeconomics
The economics of individual and corporate pension planning, long-term savings 
and retirement decisions.
Pension fund management and performance
The investment management and investment performance of occupational and 
personal pension schemes.
Pension funding and valuations
The actuarial and insurance issues related to pension schemes, including risk 
management, asset liability management, funding, scheme design, annuities 
and guarantees.
Pension law and regulation
The legal aspects of pension schemes and pension fund management.
Pension accounting, taxation and administration
The operational aspects of running pension schemes.
Marketing
The practice and ethics of selling group and individual pension products.
Macroeconomics of pensions
The implications of aggregate pension savings and the impact of the size and 
maturity of pension funds on other sectors of the economy (e.g., corporate, 
public and international sectors).
Public policy
Domestic and EU social policy towards pension provision and other employee 
benefits in the light of factors such as the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty 
and the demographic developments in Europe and other countries. 
Research disseminated by the Pensions Institute may include views on policy 
but the Pensions Institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. For more 
details, see: pensions-institute.org
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